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Why read this Report?
… because the Black Sea matters
The Black Sea region is coming into its own - but it is a contested and sometimes dangerous 
neighbourhood. It has undergone countless political transformations over time. And now, 
once again, it is becoming the subject of an intense debate. This reflects the changing 
dynamics of the Black Sea countries and the complex realities of their politics and conflicts, 
economies and societies. Geography, the interests of others and the region’s relations with 
the rest of the world in large part explain its resurgence. Straddling Europe and Asia, the 
Black Sea links north to south and east to west. Oil, gas, transport and trade routes are all 
crucial in explaining its increasing relevance.
In the last two decades the Black Sea has changed beyond recognition. We have witnessed 
the transformation of the former communist societies and the impact of globalisation. We 
have seen a heightened US interest since 9/11, the enlargement of NATO and the EU along 
its shores and repeated Russian-Ukrainian crises over gas. We have also witnessed the August 
2008 war between Russia and Georgia followed by its fallout, discussions over the fate of 
the Russian Black Sea fleet in Sebastopol, the impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on 
the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, developments regarding the conflict in Transnistria, 
the changing nature of Russo-Turkish relations and finally, the evolving global economic and 
political landscape as a result of the current world financial crisis. All of these are deeply 
affecting the region’s stability and in turn, impact global politics.
Its strategic location, between the hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian basin and energy-
hungry Europe, places the Black Sea in a unique position. But, while the opportunity to 
transfer Caspian oil and gas to European markets raises hopes for regional economic 
development and prosperity, competition to control pipelines, shipping lanes and transport 
routes to secure increased political and economic influence, not only throughout the region, 
but on a global scale, raises the risks of confrontation. By the same token, the proliferation 
of routes while potentially increasing bilateral cooperation at the expense of the regional 
may, at the same time, result in redundancy owing to too much capacity for not enough 
gas and oil. 
From 2000 until the onset of the world economic crisis, the region had one of the fastest 
rates of growth in the world. Trade between countries of the region was also on the rise. 
Since the end of the Cold War it has undergone a fundamental change in terms of economic 
development and has now secured a place on the global economic agenda.
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… because of the lack of real knowledge
The region’s real priorities and needs are still being largely ignored by insiders and outsiders 
alike. Despite heightened interest in the area by everyone from oilmen to foreign ministries 
the Black Sea still does not attract enough attention from those who should be thinking about 
how the countries of the region can solve their common problems together rather than vying 
amongst themselves for power and influence. Part of the blame for this can be attributed to 
the failure of regional actors to produce an agreed vision for the future. The emergence of 
the Black Sea as a region-between-regions and the conflicting agendas of powerful local and 
external players distort the necessary regional focus and thus blur outcomes.
For these reasons, the Commission on the Black Sea believes that a reassessment of the 
region  and its problems and priorities, is urgently needed. New thinking will provide us with 
a better understanding of what, in the real world, can actually be done. It will allow us to 
develop innovative approaches to problems, enabling policy makers to enhance the area’s 
security, stability and welfare. The emergence of a peaceful and cooperative Black Sea region 
would be of benefit to all. With this in mind, the Commission first presents an up to date 
picture which focuses on four areas. These are peace and security, economic development 
and welfare, democratic institutions and good governance and, finally, regional cooperation. 
It then presents policy recommendations for all stakeholders. 
… because immediate action is needed
With its overarching approach, the Commission has sought to promote an inclusive strategy 
taking into account the needs, priorities and interests of all stakeholders. For this, the 
Commission made a conscious effort to listen to all interested parties including civil society. 
It held meetings in Istanbul, Moscow and Berlin and Commission members also researched 
and wrote four policy reports to gain as wide a perspective as possible regarding the future. 
These can be accessed at our website: www.blackseacom.eu.
As a result, the Commission has come to an understanding that the region’s future lies in 
further democratisation and economic integration with the wider world. It also needs an 
enhanced sense of security, strengthened political stability, sustained efforts to solve its 
protracted conflicts and the renunciation of the use of force for their settlement. 
The rationale behind the preparation of this report has been the increased geopolitical 
volatility of the region which has proven, time and again, that unresolved issues can ignite 
into open warfare. Its festering conflicts retard economic development and have the potential 
to flare up into wider conflagrations. They impact regional stability and security and, unless 
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tackled, threaten far greater international ramifications. But it need not be like this. It is the 
Commission’s conviction that it is realistic to envisage a cohesive, developed, integrated and 
stable region so long as we take action now. To do so, we believe that:
•  The regional actors must renounce the use of force in their political relations and respect 
each other’s territorial integrity, the inviolability of their borders, international treaties and 
the rule of law in their dealings.
•  Interested outsiders must support efforts to secure good governance, the creation of 
interdependencies and the regionalisation of the Black Sea’s politics and economy.
•  The international community must encourage cooperative efforts and confidence-
building measures as well as action in favour of the peaceful resolution of disputes. 
… because only a regional approach will work
Black Sea politics work best if the approach is regional. The states in question should be 
encouraged to seek regional solutions for regional problems and the Black Sea already 
possesses the institutional wherewithal to address its challenges directly. However 
stakeholders must face up to the need to tackle tasks together and allow for non-state actors 
such as the business sector, NGOs and civil society to play a real role in shaping solutions. In 
this report the assumption of a “positive sum” approach underlies our vision for the Black 
Sea. In other words, we assume that concerned actors are willing to explore “win-win” 
options that permit the realisation of mutual gains and are not locked into “zero sum” or 
relativist ways of thinking, in which one party’s gain is automatically perceived as another’s 
absolute or relative loss.
Mustafa Aydın and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou
The Rapporteurs
Istanbul and Athens, May 2010
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What is the Commission on the Black Sea?
The Commission on the Black Sea is a civil society initiative developed and launched jointly in 
January 2009 by The Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh; the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation 
(BST-GMFUS), Bucharest; the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Ankara, 
and the International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), Athens.
The Commission’s work has been supported and complemented by several individuals from 
different countries, who wish to remain anonymous due to their current official affiliations or for 
personal reasons. The names of those members who are willing to associate themselves publicly 
with this report are listed below. They all serve on the Commission in a personal capacity and 
this report should in no way be construed as reflecting the views of the states, governments, 
organisations or institutions with which they are associated.
Although individual members may not necessarily agree with all the analysis and recommendations 
contained in the report, they support the overall thrust of the project and its conclusions. 
Members: Former and Current Policy Makers
Erhard Busek
Former Vice Chancellor of Austria; President, EU-Russia Centre, Brussels; Coordinator, Southeast 
European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), Vienna
Sergiu Celac
Former Foreign Minister of Romania; Senior Adviser, National Centre for Sustainable Development, 
Bucharest
Daniel Daianu
Former Minister of Finance of Romania; former Member of the European Parliament; Professor of 
Economics, National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest
Gernot Erler
Former Minister of State of the German Federal Foreign Office; Member of the German Bundestag, 
Berlin; President of the Southeast Europe Association (Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft), Munich
Tassos Giannitsis
Former Foreign Minister of Greece; Chairman, Hellenic Petroleum, Athens
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Tedo Japaridze
Former Foreign Minister of Georgia; Alternate Director General, International Centre for Black Sea 
Studies (ICBSS), Athens
Suat Kınıklıoglu
Member of Parliament, Spokesman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Parliament, AK 
Party Deputy Chairman of External Affairs, Ankara
Irakli Menagarishvili
Former Foreign Minister of Georgia, Tbilisi
Rasim Musabayov
Former Adviser on Interethnic Relations to the President of Azerbaijan; Vice-President, Centre for 
Economic and Political Research (FAR-Centre), Baku
Vartan Oskanian
Former Foreign Minister of Armenia; Chairman of the Board, the Civilitas Foundation, Yerevan
Vladimer Papava
Former Minister of Economy of Georgia; Senior Fellow, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and 
International Studies (GFSIS), Tbilisi
Volker Rühe
Former Minister of Defence of Germany, Hamburg
Özdem Sanberk
Former Ambassador and former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Istanbul
Hannes Swoboda
Member of the European Parliament; Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; Vice-Chairman, 
Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, Brussels
Borys Tarasyuk
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine; Member of Parliament; Chairman of the Verkhovna 
Rada Committee on European Integration, Kiev
Yannis Valinakis
Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Greece; Professor of International Relations, University of Athens
˘
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Members: Scholars and Practitioners
Franz-Lothar Altmann
Associate Professor for Intercultural Relations, Bucharest State University, Bucharest
Ireneusz Bil
Director, Amicus Europae Foundation of Aleksander Kwasniewski, Warsaw
Mitat Çelikpala
Deputy Dean, Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Economics and Technology, 
Ankara
Johanna Deimel
Deputy Director, Southeast Europe Association (Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft), Munich
Ovidiu Dranga
Ambassador of Romania to Belgium, Brussels
Panayotis Gavras
Head, Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki
Peter Havlik
Deputy Director, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Vienna
Jörg Himmelreich
Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, DC, and 
Berlin
Alexander Iskandaryan
Director, Caucasus Institute, Yerevan
Tim Judah
Journalist and author; Correspondent of The Economist, London
Georgi Kamov
Project Coordinator, Bulgarian School of Politics; Member of the Executive Board, Economics and 
International Relations Institute (EIRI), Sofia
´
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Alan Kasaev
Head of the CIS & Baltic Department, Russian State News Agency RIA Novosti; Co-chairman, 
Association of the Russian Society of Researchers, Moscow
Sergei Konoplyov
Director, Harvard Black Sea Security Program and US-Russia Security Program, John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge
Andrei Kortunov
President, The New Eurasia Foundation, Moscow
Bruce Lawlor
Director, Center for Technology, Security, and Policy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University, Blacksburg
Ian Lesser
Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, DC.
Andrei Lobatch
Senior Project Manager, The Foundation for Effective Governance, Kiev
Panagiota Manoli
Senior Research Fellow, International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), Athens; Lecturer, 
University of the Aegean, Rhodes
Ognyan Minchev
Executive Director, Institute for Regional and International Studies (IRIS), Sofia
Fabrizio Tassinari
Senior Fellow, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen
Yannis Tsantoulis
Research Fellow, International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), Athens
Andrei Zagorski
Leading Researcher and Professor, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), 
Moscow
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Executive Summary
The Black Sea region is a contested neighbourhood and the subject of intense debate. This reflects 
the changing dynamics of the region, its complex realities, the interests of outsiders and the 
region’s relations with the rest of the world. Its strategic position, linking north to south and east 
to west, as well as its oil, gas, transport and trade routes are all important reasons for its increasing 
relevance.
Despite heightened interest in the area however, the region’s real priorities and needs are still 
being largely ignored. In part this can be attributed to the failure of the regional actors to produce 
an agreed vision for the future. The emergence of the Black Sea as a region-between-regions and 
the conflicting agendas of powerful local and external players distort the necessary regional focus 
and blur outcomes. Thus, a reassessment of the region, with all of its problems and priorities, is 
urgently needed. This will provide all actors involved with a better understanding of what can be 
done, as well as allowing them to develop innovative approaches to problems, thus enhancing the 
region’s security, stability and welfare. The emergence of a peaceful and cooperative Black Sea 
region would be of benefit to all.
With this in mind and with its overarching approach, the Commission has sought to promote an 
inclusive strategy taking into account the needs, priorities and interests of all stakeholders in four 
essential areas; peace and security, economic development and welfare, democratic institutions and 
good governance and, finally, regional cooperation. The Commission has come to an understanding 
that the region’s future lies in further democratisation and economic integration with the wider 
world. 
The rationale behind the preparation of this report has been the increased geopolitical volatility of 
the region which, in certain places, can ignite at any given moment into open warfare. The area’s 
unresolved conflicts retard economic development and have the potential to flare up into wider 
conflagrations. They impact regional stability and security and, unless tackled, threaten far greater 
international ramifications. But it is the Commission’s conviction that it is realistic to envisage a 
cohesive, developed, integrated and stable region. To do so: 
•  The regional actors must renounce the use of force in their political relations and respect each 
other’s territorial integrity, the inviolability of their borders, international treaties and the rule 
of law in their dealings.
•  Interested outsiders must support efforts to secure good governance, the creation of 
interdependencies and the regionalisation of the Black Sea’s politics and economy.
•  The international community must encourage cooperative efforts and confidence-building 
measures as well as actions in favour of the peaceful resolution of disputes. 
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Black Sea politics work best if the approach is regional. The states in question should be encouraged 
to seek regional solutions for regional problems. The stakeholders must face up to the need to tackle 
tasks together and allow for non-state actors such as the business sector, NGOs and civil society to 
play a real role in shaping solutions. Thus the Commission recommends:
2020 Vision – A Black Sea Dimension 
Creating a new overarching concept and policy, a Black Sea Dimension, by the actors and countries 
in the region, focusing on the year 2020. Its aim would be to promote regional cooperation while 
anticipating changes in the neighbourhood. The 2020 Vision needs to be developed into a clear 
strategy which should mark the culmination of several linked initiatives. 
Enhance the profile of Black Sea regionalism
The Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) is in need of rejuvenation. Its 20th 
anniversary summit in 2012 should be an opportunity to renew the commitment of its members 
to regional cooperation and to inaugurate an overhauled BSEC in order to make it a more relevant 
organisation with greater clout. BSEC’s rebirth, expanded role and enhanced regional relevance 
could be symbolised by giving it a new name. A region-wide awareness raising competition could 
be opened for everyone in the region to suggest a new name for it and to design a new flag and 
logo.
Deal with the conflicts
Establish a high level consultative group in order to tackle the protracted conflicts and other 
outstanding issues of the region. A number of confidence-building measures and a structured 
security dialogue on relevant issues should be established. The feasibility of an international 
gathering on the Black Sea, preferably at summit level, involving the regional states and 
international stakeholders, should be the end point for the work of the high level group. 
Focus on economic issues that meet common challenges and real needs
The principles of sustainable development should be the guiding philosophy of regional 
cooperation in the Black Sea area. Rational responses to the consequences of climate change and 
the responsible use of natural, human and societal resources are essential components of such 
a development model, which should be translated into coherent policies at national and regional 
levels. Policies to improve the business environment and facilitate greater economic activity across 
borders, as well as establishing regular policy dialogues between relevant officials, need to be 
implemented.
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Promote and coordinate regional cooperation schemes at all levels
The coordination of numerous existing cooperation schemes, programmes and initiatives for the 
Black Sea needs to be taken in hand in order to unleash the full potential of the region. There is 
also a need to move beyond the common top-down approach to assure that civil society plays a role 
in the development of the region. Identifying issues which could be better addressed regionally, 
rather than nationally, is a priority. Lessons should be drawn from the experiences of other areas 
which have faced or are dealing with similar issues, such as the Baltic, the Balkans, the Danube 
region and so on. 
Promote intercultural dialogue
A clear encouragement and sponsorship of intercultural and interfaith dialogue among the peoples 
of the Black Sea is needed. Cooperation between universities should be enhanced and more 
coverage of the countries by journalists from the region, for the region, should be encouraged.
Promote the targeted training of professional groups
There is a need for the targeted training of public servants, diplomats, young leaders, 
parliamentarians and business leaders throughout the region. The creation of a Black Sea Training 
Academy would help streamline such a process. 
Promote good governance, civil society and social dialogue 
The involvement of civil society in policy making and their linkages in relation to good governance 
should be encouraged. Efforts should also be made to facilitate cooperation between civil society 
organisations in Black Sea countries including the conflict regions. Business organisations such as 
chambers of commerce, employers’ organisations and trade unions should also be encouraged to 
talk to one another in order to find and propose regional solutions for common problems.
Резюме выводов
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Резюме выводов
В регионе Черного моря переплетется множество интересов, порождая немало споров. 
Эти споры отражают меняющуюся ситуацию в регионе, ее комплексный характер, 
интересы внерегиональных участников и отношения региона с остальным миром. 
Стратегическое значение Черного моря определяется его расположением на пересечении 
путей, соединяющих Север и Юг, Восток и Запад. В регионе проходят маршруты 
транспортировки нефти и газа, другие транспортные и торговые коммуникации. Все это 
повышает его значение.
Несмотря на возрастание интереса к региону, его собственные приоритеты и потребности 
во многом остаются вне поля зрения. Это – одна из причин, по которой участники 
регионального сотрудничества так и не выработали общее видение перспектив 
развития региона. Его расположение на стыке других региональных объединений, 
разнонаправленность политики влиятельных региональных и внерегиональных сил – 
все это способствует смещению акцентов в сотрудничестве и неопределенности его 
результатов. Данное обстоятельство заставляет вновь вернуться к оценке существующих 
здесь проблем и определению приоритетов регионального сотрудничества. Их анализ 
поможет всем участникам лучше увидеть возможности для взаимодействия и нестандартно 
подойти к решению существующих проблем в интересах укрепления безопасности и 
стабильности, а также роста благосостояния в регионе. От развития черноморского 
региона как региона мира и сотрудничества выиграют все участники данного процесса.
Исходя из этих общих соображений, Комиссия обсуждала стратегию регионального 
сотрудничества, которая позволила бы включить в него всех заинтересованных 
участников и учитывала бы их приоритеты и интересы в четырех ключевых областях 
сотрудничества: укрепление мира и безопасности, экономическое развитие и рост 
благосостояния, развитие демократических институтов и надлежащего управления, 
развитие регионального сотрудничества. Комиссия пришла к выводу о том, что будущее 
региона теснейшим образом связано с дальнейшей демократизацией и интеграцией в 
мировое хозяйство.
Подготовка настоящего доклада во многом мотивировалась пониманием нарастающей 
геополитической волатильности в регионе, которая в любой момент может обернуться 
вспышкой открытого противостояния. Неурегулированность конфликтов тормозит 
здесь экономическое развитие. Эти конфликты чреваты новыми, более широкими 
столкновениями. Они наносят ущерб региональной стабильности и безопасности. 
Их неурегулированность имеет более широкие международные последствия. Тем не 
менее Комиссия убеждена в реалистичности перспективы формирования целостного, 
развитого, интегрированного и стабильного региона Черго моря. Для этого:
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•  Участники сотрудничества в регионе должны отказаться от применения силы в 
своих политических отношениях, взаимно уважать территориальную целостность 
государств и нерушимость их границ, соблюдать международные договоры и принцип 
верховенства закона в отношениях друг с другом.
•  Заинтересованные внерегиональные силы должны поддерживать утверждение 
норм надлежащего управления, укрепление взаимозависимости и регионализацию 
черноморского политического и экономического сотрудничества.
•  Международное сообщество должно поощрять укрепление сотрудничества и доверия 
в регионе, а также шаги, способствующие мирному урегулированию споров.
Оптимальным подходом к решению вопросов черноморской политики является 
региональный подход. Необходимо поощрять поиск региональных решений региональных 
проблем. Ключевые участники этого процесса должны доказать свою способность 
совместными усилиями добиваться необходимых результатов и предоставить 
негосударственным участникам сотрудничества – бизнесу, организациям гражданского 
общества – возможность принимать участие в поиске решений существующих проблем. 
В этой связи Комиссия рекомендует:
Черноморское измерение: горизонт 2020 г.
Участникам регионального сотрудничества необходимо разработать более широкую 
концепцию его развития до 2020 года – концепцию и политику «черноморского 
измерения». В ее основу должно быть положено развитие регионального сотрудничества 
с учетом ожидаемых здесь дальнейших перемен. Общее понимание того, как регион 
должен выглядеть к 2020 г., следует преобразовать в ясную стратегию действий, 
согласование которой стало бы кульминацией обсуждения ряда взаимосвязанных 
инициатив.
Повышение уровня черноморского регионального сотрудничества
Организация Черноморского экономического сотрудничества (ОЧЭС) нуждается в 
обновлении. На саммите 2012 г., приуроченном к 20-летию Организации, целесообразно 
не только подтвердить приверженность региональному сотрудничеству, но и принять 
решение о реформе ОЧЭС, которая позволила бы повысить ее роль. Обновление 
ОЧЭС, повышение ее роли в регионе можно было бы символически подчеркнуть 
переименованием Организации. Проведение открытого регионального конкурса на ее 
новое название и логотип способствовало бы популяризации Организации.
Поиск урегулирования конфликтов
В интересах содействия урегулированию затяжных конфликтов и иных нерешенных 
региональных проблем целесообразно создать консультативную группу высокого 
уровня. Это способствовало бы укреплению доверия и налаживанию структурированного 
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диалога по вопросам укрепления безопасности. Конечной целью работы группы могла 
бы стать проработка вопроса о созыве международного совещания по черноморскому 
региону – желательно на высшем уровне – с участием как стран региона, так и ключевых 
внерегиональных держав и организаций.
Решение экономических вопросов, вытекающих из общих вызовов и 
потребностей
В основу регионального сотрудничества должны быть положены принципы устойчивого 
развития: рациональное реагирование на изменение климата и ответственное 
использование природных, человеческих и общественных ресурсов. Эти принципы 
должны последовательно претворяться в жизнь на национальном и региональном уровне. 
Для этого необходимо согласовать меры по улучшению условий деятельности бизнеса, 
расширению трансграничной экономической деятельности и наладить регулярный 
диалог представителей соответствующих государственных органов.
Согласование механизмов регионального сотрудничества на разных уровнях
Для более полного раскрытия потенциала регионального сотрудничества необходимо 
обеспечить бóльшую согласованность многочисленных механизмов, программ и 
инициатив, реализуемых в черноморском регионе. Следует отказаться от практики 
решения всех вопросов регионального сотрудничества «сверху». Гражданское общество 
должно играть в их решении бóльшую роль. Приоритет должен быть отдан выявлению 
проблем, которые проще решить на региональном, а не национальном уровне. 
Целесообразно учесть опыт решения таких проблем региональными организацияими, в 
частности, государств Балтийского моря, Балкан, придунайских стран и другими.
Межкультурный диалог
Необходимо всемерно поощрять и поддерживать межкультурный и межрелигиозный 
диалог народов черноморского региона. Расширять сотрудничество между 
университетами и содействовать более широкому освещению в СМИ жизни и 
событий стран региона.
Целевая подготовка кадров
Существует потребность в целенаправленном повышении кфалификации 
государственных служащих, дипломатов, молодых лидеров, парламентариев и лидеров 
бизнеса стран региона. Создание Черноморской Академии позволило бы оптимизировать 
эту деятельность.
Резюме выводов
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Надлежащее управление, гражданское общество и общественный диалог
Целесообразно шире привлекать организации гражданского общества к обсуждению 
и подготовке политических решений, тем самым способствуя утверждению практики 
надлежащего управления. Следует способствовать расширению сотрудничества между 
организацями гражданского общества стран региона, включая регионы конфликтов. Важно 
поощрять диалог между организациями бизнеса, такими как торгово-промышленные 
палаты, союзы предпринимателей и профессиональные союзы, с тем чтобы они могли 
предлагать региональные решения их общих проблем.
Yönetici Özeti
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Yönetici Özeti
Karadeniz Bölgesi yoğun çekişmelerin odağında olan tartışmalı bir alandır. Bu, bölgenin hızla 
değişen dinamikleri, karmaşık gerçekleri, bölge dışı güçlerin çıkarları ve bölgenin dünyanın 
geri kalanıyla ilişkilerinin bir yansımasıdır. Bölgenin, kuzeyi güneye ve doğuyu batıya bağlayan 
stratejik konumunun yanı sıra, önemli petrol, gaz, taşımacılık ve ticaret rotalarının üzerinde yer 
alması önemini giderek artırmaktadır.
Ne var ki, bölgeye yönelik bunca ilgiye rağmen, bölgenin asıl öncelikleri ve ihtiyaçları hala 
büyük ölçüde göz ardı edilmektedir. Bu bir dereceye kadar, bölgesel aktörlerin gelecek için 
ortak bir vizyonda birleşememelerine bağlanabilir. Karadeniz’in bölgeler arası bir bölge olarak 
ortaya çıkması ve güçlü iç ve dış aktörlerin birbirleriyle çatışan çıkarları, bölge için gereken 
odaklanmayı engelleyerek, işbirliğinin olası olumlu sonuçlarını zayıflatmaktadır. Bu nedenle, 
tüm sorunları ve öncelikleriyle birlikte bölgenin acilen yeniden değerlendirilmesine ihtiyaç 
duyulmaktadır. Bu, ilgili tüm aktörlerin ne yapılması gerektiğini daha iyi anlamalarını ve 
sorunlara yaratıcı şekilde yaklaşabilmelerini sağlayacak, böylece bölgenin güvenliği, istikrarı 
ve refahını arttıracaktır. Barışçıl ve işbirliği içinde bir Karadeniz Bölgesi ise  herkesin yararına 
olacaktır. 
Karadeniz Komisyonu tüm bunları akılda tutarak ve kapsayıcı bir yaklaşımla, bu raporda ‘barış 
ve güvenlik’, ‘ekonomik gelişme ve refah’, ‘demokratik kurumlar ve iyi yönetişim’ ve son olarak 
‘bölgesel işbirliği’ olmak üzere dört önemli alanda tüm paydaşların ihtiyaç, öncelik ve çıkarlarını 
dikkate alan kapsamlı bir strateji sunmaya çalışmıştır. Komisyon, bölgenin geleceğinin daha 
fazla demokratikleşme ve dünyanın geri kalanıyla daha fazla ekonomik bütünleşmede yattığı 
sonucuna varmıştır.
Bu raporun hazırlanmasının ardındaki temel neden, bölgedeki jeopolitik istikrarsızlığın artması 
ve bunun belirli bölgelerde savaşa yol açabilme ihtimalidir. Bölgenin çözülmemiş çatışmaları 
ekonomik gelişmeyi geciktirmelerinin yanı sıra, büyük krizlere neden olma potansiyelini de 
bünyelerinde barındırmaktadır. Söz konusu çatışmalar, bölgesel istikrara ve güvenliğe etki 
etmekte ve çözümlenmedikleri takdirde uluslararası ortamda dallanıp budaklanma tehlikesi 
içermektedir. Öte yandan Komisyon kaynaştırıcı, gelişmiş, entegre ve istikrarlı bir bölgenin 
ortaya çıkartılabileceğine samimi şekilde inanmaktadır. Bunun gerçekleştirilebilmesi için:
•   Bölgesel aktörler siyasi ilişkilerinde güç kullanımından vazgeçmeli ve birbirlerinin toprak 
bütünlüğüne, sınırların ihlal edilmezliğine, uluslararası anlaşmalara ve ilişkilerinde 
hukukun üstünlüğüne saygı göstermelidirler.
•  Bölge dışından olmasına rağmen bölgede çıkarları olan ülkeler iyi yönetişimin 
sağlamlaştırılması, karşılıklı dayanışmanın yaratılması ve Karadeniz siyaseti ve 
ekonomisinin bölgeselleştirilmesi konusundaki çabaları desteklemelidirler.
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•  Uluslararası toplum anlaşmazlıkların barışçıl şekilde çözülmesi yönündeki faaliyetlerin yanı 
sıra, işbirliği çabalarını ve güven-arttırıcı önlemleri teşvik etmelidir. 
Karadeniz siyasetine yaklaşım bölgesel olduğunda en iyi sonucu verecektir. İlgili devletler 
bölgesel sorunlara bölgesel çözümler aramaya teşvik edilmelidir. Paydaşlar görevlerin 
üstesinden birlikte gelme ihtiyacıyla yüzleşmeli ve iş dünyası ve sivil toplum kuruluşları gibi 
hükümetler dışı aktörlerin sorunların çözümünde rol almasına izin vermelidirler. Bu nedenle 
Komisyon şunları önermektedir:
2020 Vizyonu – Karadeniz Boyutu
Bölgedeki aktörler ve ülkelerin katılımıyla 2020 yılına odaklanan yeni bir kapsayıcı kavram ve 
politika olarak Karadeniz Boyutu oluşturulmalıdır. Bu, bölgedeki değişimlere önceden hazırlıklı 
biçimde bölgesel işbirliğini teşvik etmeyi hedeflemektedir. 2020 Vizyonu ilgili teşebbüslerin 
bütünleşmesinin altını çizecek bir stratejiye ihtiyaç duymaktadır.
Karadenizde bölgeselleşmenin geliştirilip güçlendirilmesi 
Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü’nün (KEİ) yenilenmesi gerekmektedir. 2012’de yapılacak 
20. yıl zirvesi, üyelerin bölgesel işbirliğine bağlılıklarının yenilenmesi ve KEİ’nin daha geniş 
nüfuza sahip, daha işlevsel bir örgüte dönüştürülmesi için bir fırsat olmalıdır. KEİ’nin yeniden 
doğuşu, gelişen rolü ve artan bölgesel önemi yeni bir isimle sembolize edilebilir. Örgüte yeni 
bir isim, flama ve logo bulunması amacıyla bölgede herkese açık, bölgesel bilinci arttırıcı bir 
yarışma düzenlenebilir.
Sorunlarla başa çıkma
Bölgenin uzun süredir devam eden ihtilafları ve diğer önemli sorunlarının üstesinden gelmek 
amacıyla bir üst düzey danışma grubu oluşturulmalıdır. İlgili konularda bir dizi güven arttırıcı 
önlem alınmalı ve planlı bir güvenlik diyalogu kurulmalıdır. Üst düzey grubun çalışmasının nihai 
hedefi, Karadeniz’e ilişkin bölge devletlerini ve uluslararası paydaşları içeren, tercihen zirve 
düzeyinde uluslararası bir toplantının gerçekleştirilmesi olmalıdır.
Ortak zorluklar ve gerçek ihtiyaçlara karşılık gelen ekonomik konulara odaklanma
Karadeniz etrafındaki bölgesel işbirliğinin öncü felsefesi sürdürülebilir kalkınma prensipleri 
olmalıdır. İklim değişikliğinin sonuçlarına karşı üretilecek akılcı çözümler ve doğal, insani ve 
toplumsal kaynakların sorumluluk bilinciyle kullanılması, ulusal ve bölgesel düzeyde uyumlu 
politikalara dönüştürülmesi gereken kalkınma modeli için önemli bileşenlerdir. İş ortamını 
geliştirmek ve sınırlar ötesi ekonomik faaliyetleri artırmak için ilgili ülke yetkilileri arasında 
düzenli siyasi diyalog kuracak politikalar uygulanmalıdır.
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Tüm kademelerde bölgesel işbirliği planlarının geliştirilip düzenlenmesi
Bölgenin potansiyelini tam olarak gerçekleştirebilmesi için hâlihazırda mevcut çok sayıdaki 
işbirliği programı ve teşebbüsü arasında koordinasyonun sağlanması gereklidir. Bölgenin 
gelişmesinde sivil toplumun da rol almasının sağlanması için alışılmış yukarıdan-aşağı 
yaklaşımın ötesine geçilmesi şarttır. Ulusal yerine bölgesel düzeyde ele alınacak konuların 
belirlenmesi önceliklidir. Daha önce benzer konularla uğraşmış ve uğraşmakta olan Baltık, 
Balkanlar, ya da Tuna gibi bölgelerin deneyimlerinden dersler çıkarılmalıdır.
Kültürlerarası diyalogun geliştirilmesi
Karadeniz halkları arasında kültürler ve inançlar arası diyalogun güçlendirilmesi ve 
desteklenmesi gereklidir. Üniversiteler arasındaki işbirliği güçlendirilmeli ve bölgedeki 
gazetecilerin, bölge hakkında ve bölge için daha fazla haber yapması sağlanmalıdır.
Profesyonel gruplar için hedefe yönelik eğitim programları geliştirilmesi
Bölgedeki kamu çalışanlarının, diplomatların, genç liderlerin, parlamenterlerin ve iş dünyası 
liderlerinin hedefe yönelik eğitimine ihtiyaç vardır. Karadeniz Eğitim Akademisi kurulması böyle 
bir sürece yön vermeye yardımcı olacaktır.
İyi yönetişim, sivil toplum ve soysal diyaloğun geliştirilmesi
Politika oluşturma sürecine ve bu politikaların iyi yönetişimle ilişkilendirilmesine sivil toplumun 
dahil edilmesi desteklenmelidir. Sorunlu bölgeler de dahil olmak üzere, Karadeniz bölgesindeki 
ülkelerde yer alan sivil toplum örgütleri arasında işbirliği sağlanması için çaba gösterilmelidir. 
Ticaret odaları, işveren birlikleri, sendikalar gibi iş organizasyonları da ortak sorunlara bölgesel 
çözümler bulunması hedefiyle birbirleriyle iletişim kurmaya özendirilmelidir.
Introduction: The State of Play
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Introduction: The State of Play
Situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, the Black Sea has been a zone of contention and 
confrontation for centuries. From antiquity, the region was traditionally the backyard of one or two 
powers, which dominated and closed it to the outside world. Then, during the Cold War, it found 
itself on the frontline of the global struggle for dominance. For 40 years NATO members, Turkey 
and Greece, guarded the south and south-east while Warsaw Pact members, the Soviet Union, 
Bulgaria and Romania, dominated the rest. However, despite the fact that the region was divided by 
East–West strategic rivalry, this strained political and military balance did provide stability, albeit 
accompanied by marginalisation, political fragmentation and economic paralysis. The existence 
of blocs precluded the possibility of much meaningful communication and cooperation across the 
sea. At the same time the situation left isolated some of the region’s lands and peoples from the 
outside world.
With the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical position of the Black Sea changed beyond recognition.
The demise of communism unleashed armed conflicts and pent up historical tensions. It led to 
the dissolution of a superpower, the birth of six new sovereign states and several secessionist 
movements. It also opened the region to outside influences and competition while at the same time 
witnessing the birth of a slow process of region-building. While the Black Sea states understood 
the need to replace the post-communist space with region-wide entities and initiatives that would 
provide it with an identity, as well as generate opportunities for cooperation and deeper integration, 
their efforts have been seriously hampered by a number of factors. These include uneven economic 
and political development, a resurgence of competing nationalisms accompanied by longstanding 
animosities between the region’s players and the competing interests of key actors. 
The driving force for cooperation in the post-Cold War era has been the need to move away from the 
disruptive influences of global ideological and military confrontation to the attractions of economic 
cooperation which would benefit all of the region’s people. But for the newly independent states, 
the new regional organisations have often been seen as forums not just for cooperation with their 
neighbours but also as yet another venue at which to raise their national flags and underscore 
their newfound state identities. 
The advent of regionalism in the Black Sea in the aftermath of the Cold War was seen by many as 
the most sensible way to overcome the economic and security vacuum left in its wake. For them, 
participation in regional cooperation schemes was regarded as a step towards integration into 
broader global economic, social and political systems. There was a widespread belief that these 
groupings and initiatives, through the adoption of confidence-building measures, could contribute 
to geopolitical stability by facilitating collaborative action against the rise of new threats.
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As a consequence, a number of regional initiatives were launched around the Black Sea and 
interstate interactions have increased, especially as a result of the work of the Organisation of 
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) which was established in 1992. It has, above all, 
two virtues. It is the most inclusive of regional organisations in terms of membership and, in 
terms of its remit, the most comprehensive. Since then, the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task 
Group (BlackSeaFor), Black Sea Harmony, the Black Sea Forum, ODED-GUAM, the Community of 
Democratic Choice (CDC), the Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, 
amongst others, have been established. Although all have different priorities, all profess a belief in 
the utility of regional cooperation as a basis of enhanced stability and security. The level of regional 
networking and interaction has increased as a result.
In this report the terms “Black Sea region”, “Black Sea area” and “Black Sea” are used 
interchangeably. The Commission considers the following countries as part of its definition 
of the area; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, 
Turkey and Ukraine. They are the regional stakeholders. The other key players are the EU 
and NATO, both of whom are now present on the Black Sea, along with the United States. 
All three have openly expressed their interests in the region and have formulated policies 
accordingly.
Antagonisms have persisted however due to the emergence of an increasingly competitive 
environment, sometimes bordering on, or even exploding into, open confrontation. In geopolitical 
terms, being situated at the crossroads of the latest phase of EU and NATO enlargement, as well 
as the US-led “global war on terror”, the region has acquired a new significance, especially in the 
years since 9/11. With its roles in the transportation of energy resources and as an increasingly 
attractive economic space, the Black Sea region has gradually evolved into one of geopolitical 
significance. It has emerged as one of the key areas in an intensified competition between the major 
global powers; Russia, the United States and to a certain extent, the EU. All three have developed 
their own regional policies; the “near abroad”, the Wider Black Sea Region and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) respectively. All of them are characterised by exclusiveness and 
divisiveness. They have employed different means, from accession negotiations to the construction 
of pipelines and supporting friendly governments or undermining unfriendly ones, to strategically 
position themselves in the area, to expand their influence and secure economic and political 
dominance. The smaller Black Sea countries, caught in this spiral of competition have become, 
willingly or otherwise, players in this divisive game. 
While this attention has contributed to the creation of new regional and sub-regional geopolitical 
groupings, the fact that long standing conflicts remain unresolved, the acute problems raised by 
difficult energy-cum-security issues and the presence of strong actors has resulted in a fragile 
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balance of power. In this context, the heightened involvement of the EU and the US alongside Russia 
and Turkey, the two most powerful countries of the region, has affected the process of regionalism, 
creating a complicated geopolitical jigsaw. Although various upheavals including secessionism, 
ethnic conflicts, political and economic crises and “coloured” revolutions were initiated at domestic 
level, the key actors have maintained a significant role throughout the region.
In the current state of play, increased US attention to the region since 9/11, the war of August 
2008 and the ongoing financial-cum-economic crisis, together with the emerging structures of new 
global political and financial governance are forcing a change of paradigm both in world politics 
and consequently in the Black Sea region too. It is to be expected that the involvement of global 
actors in Black Sea affairs will become ever more intense in the years to come. With the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty and the birth of its new foreign and security policy instruments plus 
negotiations over a new generation of agreements with Russia and other regional players, the EU 
can be expected to play a more assertive role. It is also likely that NATO, which is working on a new 
strategic concept and the United States, after the “reset” of its relations with Russia, will redefine 
their global and hence Black Sea priorities. 
As unipolarity has been steadily giving way since 2001 to an emerging new world order in which 
power is far more diffuse, the Black Sea has emerged as a geopolitical hub. The issues at hand are 
many, complex and challenging. By and large, global security paradoxes have been hard wired into 
the Black Sea system. In terms of paradoxes:
•  While the Black Sea has become a new strategic arena for Europe, Russia and the US in terms 
of energy security, conflicts, trade and migration - the incentives for regional cooperation are 
clear, even in the face of numerous disagreements and divisions. There is thus an ongoing 
battle between obstacles and incentives for regional cooperation.
•  The economic data and improving socio-economic indicators, at least until the onset of the 
global financial crisis, demonstrated that this was, and hence could be again, one of the fastest 
growing regions of the world. However, wide ranging disparities among and within the states 
of the region remain.
•  Despite the economic disparities of the region, the increased prosperity of some countries has 
led, in some cases, to higher military expenditure. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
increasing economic prosperity may not be a sufficient guarantee against the resumption of 
armed hostilities.
•  The power and ability of certain issues to both divide and unite is paramount, especially in the 
energy sector. The correlation between energy supplies, competition for transit routes, pipeline 
security and political-cum-economic spheres of influence, contributes to enhancing fault lines 
as energy issues increasingly become hostage to power politics.
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•  While in general terms the EU supports regional initiatives which favour integration and the 
creation of prosperity and stability, its economic and political attractions operate in relation 
to individual countries rather than to the region as a whole. As a result, regional stakeholders 
prefer privileged bilateral ties with the EU to the detriment of cooperation between one 
another. Specific EU policies with regard to regional cooperation have not yet developed into 
a comprehensive strategic design. The current debate regarding the confusing objectives, 
instruments and resources for the ENP, the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership, is 
a case in point. It is also a paradox that while the EU desires a stable and democratic region, 
policy making and EU clout are weakened by the fact that member states often have diverging 
interests and policies here, especially in relation to Russia.
•  The notion of “neighbourhood”, which should be understood within a positive context in terms 
of developing regionally based economic and political support systems, has turned into a 
major conundrum. This is because all of the key stakeholders have started to develop their own 
overlapping “neighbourhoods” which, in the longer run, seem set to create further divisions 
rather than encourage cooperation.
•  While regional cooperation is sought by most of the stakeholders, its institutionalisation 
has proved difficult since some of the local players have consistently preferred bilateral 
arrangements to multilateral environments for policy discussions.
•  The most challenging paradox has to do with the conflict between globalisation and entrenched 
nationalism in the Black Sea area, which in and of itself, is one of the world’s most multipolar 
regions. 
Taking the above into account, the current state of play is, and will be, defined by the following 
key challenges:
Energy & Energy Security: The energy dispute between Russia and Ukraine in the winter of 2008-
09 was a clear indication of the importance of energy security for the region and for its customers. 
In the context of the Black Sea, the principal transport and pipeline routes for oil and gas from 
the Caspian basin and Russia to the West have become a key test of several types of relationship. 
Firstly, those between the producers; Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, secondly, 
between the transit countries; Russia, Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine and finally between the 
consumers; EU countries, Turkey and others. The ability to strike a rational balance between the 
respective interests of all players, meaning security of supply for consumers, security of demand 
for producers and security of steady revenue for transit countries, will be a make-or-break issue for 
the development of successful models of cooperation between the Black Sea states. 
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Regional Security Dimensions: The prevailing vestiges of ideological or bloc divisions, whether 
coming from Moscow or western capitals, remain a challenge. The current attempt at redefining 
EU, American and NATO relations with Russia will determine whether a cooperative or competitive 
mood will prevail in the region. The same can be said for relations between Turkey and Russia. 
Finally, as the August 2008 war demonstrated yet again, Russia is still wary about the gradual 
gravitation of post-Soviet countries towards the West. In the European security space, the Black 
Sea area presents us with a unique combination of challenges, old and new, conventional and non-
conventional. The progress of the OSCE “Corfu Process” on security could therefore, be highly 
relevant for stability in the Black Sea region. 
 
Sustaining Prosperity and Increasing Standards of Living: This represents the greatest 
aspiration of all countries in the region. It will prove highly challenging due to the global financial 
and economic crisis, persisting regional rivalries and domestic structural weaknesses which 
require greater transparency, improved governance and the necessity of implementing politically 
painful and difficult reforms. 
From Nation Building to Region Building: Considering that about half of the countries in the 
region have had little experience of sovereign statehood, the political transformations of the past two 
decades have been impressive. However, progress towards the establishment and proper functioning 
of democratic institutions and the rule of law has proved uneven and been marked by occasional 
setbacks and reversals. The tendency among some of the region’s post-Soviet states to drift towards 
authoritarianism and restrictive economic policies, coupled with the challenges raised by separatist 
movements and inter-state disputes have inhibited the promotion of cooperative attitudes.
The Commission and its Genesis
With the concerns outlined in this report in mind, a number of individuals, both from 
within the region and from outside, decided that it was high time to take a fresh look 
at the Black Sea with a view to finding solutions to ongoing and upcoming problems. 
Thus the Commission was born. Our sense of urgency was spurred on by the regional 
consequences of the world financial crisis and the legacy of the Russian-Georgian war, 
which demonstrated the explosive potential of the unresolved conflicts. The advent of a 
new American administration with a reformist agenda and of a new team of leaders at the 
helm of the EU provided us with an additional spur. 
As such, and with regard to the prevailing geopolitical and economic realities, Commission 
members believe that it is imperative to foster innovative policies through meaningful 
political dialogue in the Black Sea region in order to contain and ultimately resolve existing 
differences by peaceful means and to turn the tide in favour of cooperation and stability. 
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The alternative, harking back to Cold War-style competition and confrontation, is too bleak 
to contemplate. Moreover, just as regional stakeholders and outside powers are reassessing 
and redefining their Black Sea policies, Commission members believe that an even-handed, 
multi-level and multi-disciplinary approach accompanied by policy-oriented, practical and 
adaptable recommendations can influence the deliberations of interested parties and thus 
the future of the area. Indeed, the Commission believes that the timing of this report and 
its recommendations are opportune.
The region’s increasing importance implies an urgent need to meet existing and emerging 
challenges. What is also needed is a commitment by all parties to realise the region’s 
potential. To that end the Commission hopes to contribute to the mobilisation of the relevant 
resources and policies. 
Conscious that any attempt to deal with all the events that deserve mention would be 
beyond the scope of this report, the Commission, in order to properly formulate conclusions 
regarding what needs to be done, decided to focus on four specific topics; peace and 
security, economic development and welfare, democratic institutions and good governance 
and finally, regional cooperation. Each of these encapsulates the key issues and the need 
to address the challenges they pose. The four are interconnected and trying to address 
one without dealing with the others is not an option. This report therefore recommends a 
comprehensive approach with movement on all fronts simultaneously.
By addressing these four topics, the Commission aims to contribute to a joint vision and 
a common strategy for the Black Sea region by developing new knowledge in areas of 
key concern. As existing research tends to focus on specific topics, for example energy, 
transport or the environment and is mostly viewed from one-sided national or Western and 
Euro-Atlantic perspectives, the Commission aimed to redress this imbalance by developing 
a comprehensive, policy-oriented study jointly with scholars and stakeholders from the 
region as well as from countries outside the Black Sea area, with a view to being as objective 
and balanced as possible. The goal is to present not just short-term, sectoral or stakeholder-
specific interests, but to provide input for a new vision and long-term strategy for the Black 
Sea as a region.
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Peace and Security
The debate about the security dynamics of the Black Sea region is wide in scope. It is particularly 
relevant as it impacts on the progress of regional cooperation, economic development and good 
governance. It has a geographic dimension given its Eurasian location and its major strategic 
transport and trade arteries. It also has a natural resources perspective with regard to energy and 
involves the changing nature of threats and actors, whether of conventional or non-conventional 
types.
A basic dimension of the security paradigm is both its linkage to the bipolar model of the Cold War 
era and the unleashing and evolution of several ethnic, national and territorial conflicts suppressed 
during that period. The security context has also been shaped by other post-Cold War trends. These 
include globalisation and greater international cooperation coupled with the blurring of boundaries 
between soft and hard security threats. We also need to take account of the growing relevance of 
human security concerns such as environmental degradation, arms, people and drugs trafficking, 
as well as the threat perceptions of the stakeholders vis-à-vis one another. The threat of social 
unrest as a consequence of global financial and economic turbulence is also a possibility. The main 
challenges and concerns include:
The conflicting interests of the main actors and stakeholders: The large number of regional 
and extra-regional actors implies clashing interests that pull Black Sea security policy options in 
different directions. This is particularly evident in the power play between Russia and the Euro-
Atlantic community. For Russia, the main concern is the restoration and consolidation of its power 
in its “near abroad” while restricting the presence of other actors in the region. While states like 
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova might at times feel stifled by Russia, its leaders consider their country 
to be the object of containment. The increased activity of NATO, either through its enlargement 
policy, the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) or Membership Action Plans (MAPs) plus the 
signing of bilateral defence agreements with the US and support given to pro-Western elites have all 
served to increase Russia’s perception of insecurity. Its fear of encirclement was clearly discernible 
in its government’s statements made prior to and during the August 2008 war. 
In this context, the Russian position has gravitated towards bolstering its influence around its 
borders. This has meant demanding a say in all energy related projects, preventing the emergence 
of anti-Russian coalitions, curbing NATO expansion and countering and suppressing separatism 
within its borders while encouraging the same beyond them. 
Euro-Atlantic policy on the other hand has evolved from the careful handling of Russia in the early post-
Cold War period (“Russia-first”) to trying to prevent the then newly independent states from falling 
under the Russian sphere of influence and assuring a steady and secure supply of Caspian oil and 
gas. The attempt to expand NATO to the wider region was a consequence of the shift of transatlantic 
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security concerns within the context of new geopolitical concepts such as the “Broader Middle East 
and North Africa” and the “Wider Black Sea Region” in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
As for the EU, its policy has evolved from an emphasis on contractual, bilateral relations to a more 
holistic approach. This means viewing the Black Sea as a single cohesive policy area, a concept first 
defined in its Black Sea Synergy policy of 2008. This succeeded the European Security Strategy of 
2003 which emphasised the need for stability, security and prosperity in its wider neighbourhood. 
In consequence the Union has elaborated a number of policies towards the region. The first was the 
European Neighbourhood Policy of 2004 which offered a privileged relationship but without the 
promise of accession. Then came the Black Sea Synergy with its promotion of regional cooperation 
and a region-wide, projects-based approach aimed at encouraging the resolution of conflicts. 
Finally, hot on the heels of the August 2008 war, came the Eastern Partnership with its emphasis on 
deeper integration with the EU through bilateral action. These policies have been complemented by 
the appointment of Special Representatives and the despatching of Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) missions. 
Many of the area’s states, caught between the positions of the more powerful actors, practice and 
apply differing policies respective to their degree of allegiance to Russia, the EU or the transatlantic 
community. Turkey however seems to offer a comprehensive vision for the area, including its recently 
evolved “zero-problems with neighbours” and region-based foreign policy. It has also supported 
or initiated a number of regional cooperation schemes including BSEC, BlackSeaFor, Black Sea 
Harmony and the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform. Turkey’s overriding aim with these 
is the creation of a region where, as they and the Russians say, “extra-regional powers” would not 
be needed in the security sphere. Assisting regional transition, creating opportunities for political 
and economic cooperation and supporting the Black Sea area’s integration into the global economy 
are also Turkish goals. Finally, ensuring that maritime security remains the exclusive concern of 
the riparian states and preserving the current legal regime of the Straits, based on the Montreux 
Convention, are Turkey’s sine qua non. By contrast, the smaller littoral countries, especially Romania, 
oppose what they portray as a “Turkish-Russian condominium” and try to attract “extra-regional 
powers”, especially the US, to balance the influence of the two main regional actors. 
Meanwhile, EU members Greece, Bulgaria and Romania seek to enhance the influence and role of the 
Union in terms of its common foreign, security and defence policies due to the lack of a clearly defined 
NATO policy for the Black Sea. Consequently the EU is also becoming a relevant security actor here. 
The changing nature of threats and actors: The sheer number and complexity of security 
threats, both potential and actual, contribute to a general perception of the region as insecure 
and unstable. Some of these include the contested notions of “neighbourhood”, persisting ethnic, 
religious and other differences and the ramifications of Russia’s recognition of the independence 
of the Georgian breakaways, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
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In this context, the future of the breakaways and the other protracted conflicts remains unclear. They 
continue to hinder the progress of the states concerned, regional cooperation and the security and 
stability of the Black Sea as a whole. The weak, unaccountable and disorganised nature of some of the 
countries and entities in question contains the risk that they acquire the features of failed states. This 
entails the danger of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It also implies vastly 
increased opportunities for the trafficking of drugs, arms and people, and organised crime in general. 
The military dimension of regional security remains a matter of concern and so is the growing 
tendency of some states towards authoritarianism and growing militarisation, (see Annex II). 
The Black Sea region stands out as the most exposed area of Europe as a result of the unilateral 
suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and its accompanying confidence 
and stability-building measures. Pending a negotiated agreement on some new arrangement 
concerning hard security issues in a broader European context, it is therefore imperative to secure 
the implementation of the provisions now in place together with proper verification procedures. 
The issue of energy security is also a major concern. The importance of the diversification of 
energy supplies and the risks related to dependency on Russia and the value of gas and oil from 
other sources to European markets are all issues with obvious ramifications as the 2008-09 
dispute between Russia and Ukraine demonstrated. Energy has not only become of major national, 
international and regional concern but, in the case of the Black Sea, a test case for the development 
of a reliable and sustainable pattern of relationships amongst producer, consumer and transit 
countries. The capacity of Russia to meet Europe’s natural gas demand is intimately connected with 
its ability to deliver without making major investments in technology and infrastructure. All this 
makes the Black Sea a potential energy transit hub while, at the same time, a zone of rivalry.
For these reasons, the differing expectations, perspectives and interests of the stakeholders prevent 
the development of a regional security regime. While the EU and the United States promote norms 
and values based on representative democracy, the rule of law and human rights, in the hope of 
contributing to peace building in the region, authoritarianism, militarisation and power politics are 
on the rise. Common strategies aimed at addressing and overcoming deadlocks, differences and 
regional security threats, have proven difficult to arrive at. This is also of concern with regard to 
the diminishing role of inclusive international organisations such as the OSCE and the increasing 
relevance of the EU with its selective membership. Finally, hitherto tried and tested conflict 
prevention and resolution mechanisms have been unsuccessful in the Black Sea region and there 
is a clear need for new and creative ideas with regard to conflict resolution. 
The question is thus whether a single security structure for the Black Sea region which takes into 
account all the key concerns, challenges and interests of its stakeholders is realistic or whether it 
is doomed to further instability despite its growing significance for “extra-regional” powers.
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Economic Development and Welfare
While market economies encountered centrally planned ones in the Black Sea during the Cold War, 
since then the region has seen a universal shift towards the market. This was neither easy nor 
linear. The first phase, which lasted until 1995, was a period of sharp economic decline. This saw the 
collapse of the old systems of production and distribution, weak or non-existent legal frameworks, 
dysfunctional financial sectors, inconsistent structural reforms and macroeconomic instability. In 
the case of some transition countries the problems were compounded by the urgent requirements 
of nation and state-building. Even for non-transition states like Greece and Turkey, this period was 
marked by relatively high inflation, fiscal imbalances and weak or uneven growth.
The second phase, between 1995 and 1999, saw the stabilisation and consolidation of regional 
economies with improved security and political stability, the strengthening of the first generation 
of market-oriented structural reforms and signs of macroeconomic stability. However, at the same 
time, the economies of the Black Sea countries had to contend with the increasing volatility of 
energy prices, the 1998 Russian financial crisis and the 1999 earthquake in Turkey.
The third phase, from 2000 to the third quarter of 2008, was a period of high and sustained 
growth with real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increases for the region as a whole averaging 
6% per annum, equal to a cumulative real expansion of 68% for the period. It saw rising living 
standards, increased trade and investment and the integration of Black Sea societies into the 
broader European and global economic context. The fourth phase, since the third quarter of 2008, 
has been marked by a sharp halt in growth coupled with a low inflow of foreign capital due to the 
global financial crisis.
Notwithstanding the adverse impact of the crisis, the Black Sea is a very different place today 
than it was in 1999 and even more dramatically so than in 1989. The transition from a state-led 
to a market-oriented economic system has, to a great extent, been completed. There has been a 
greater degree of prosperity across the region, even if it is unevenly distributed between and 
within countries. Per capita incomes increased nearly five times in dollar terms between 1999 
and 2008 – from roughly US $2,100 in 1999 to US $10,300 in 2008. Intra-regional dynamics also 
improved thanks to the development of a number of organisations, processes, and policies aimed 
at promoting cooperation and economic integration with increased flows of people, capital, goods 
and services across the region, as well as greater convergence with the EU. Both sovereign credit 
ratings and foreign direct investment figures have markedly improved since 1999, although they 
have slipped during the current economic downturn. 
The crisis has subjected the region’s financial systems to extreme stress. Lending growth has 
slowed sharply, resulting in a downturn in economic activity and, for some countries, a painful 
process of deleveraging. Although government interventions succeeded in stabilising banks and 
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averting a financial system collapse, the crisis has highlighted economic vulnerabilities requiring 
urgent attention. With the notable exception of Azerbaijan, all Black Sea countries experienced an 
economic contraction in 2009, to the order of –6.4%. While the worst in terms of economic decline 
appears to be over, the nature of the crisis and the impact of the recession on key western European 
markets, suggest that recovery will likely be slow and uncertain in coming years. For 2010 growth 
to the order of 1–2% appears most likely, and while annual growth across the region may reach 
3–4% thereafter, a return to the high rates prior to the crisis is unlikely.
Despite the diversity of the countries in question in terms of size, economic structure and levels of 
development, a number of challenges and issues concern the region as a whole. Their measurability 
is made more difficult by the different levels of integration of the countries into the global economy 
and the EU. Contrast for example Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey with the relatively small 
and sometimes isolated economies of Moldova and the states of the Caucasus. Then we need to 
consider the challenges of social heterogeneity, the political system and economic structure of 
Ukraine and the challenges of economic diversification faced by energy exporters, Russia and 
Azerbaijan.
Challenges include long term demographic trends and the threat they pose for the quantity and 
quality of the workforce, pension systems, the business environment and the sustainability of 
social security programmes. While the implications of shrinking populations in most of the region’s 
countries are wide ranging, reforms in the areas of competitiveness and productivity are key to 
minimising their impact. Dealing with the current global financial crisis is a priority as it has 
affected the region collectively and countries individually. While each state’s prescriptions vary, the 
need for cooperation and coordination through regional institutions such as BSEC is paramount.
Good relations with key actors, including the US, the EU, China and the Middle Eastern and Central 
Asian countries, are important from an economic perspective. In this context, the most significant 
parameter is the future evolution of relations with the EU, whose decisions have direct impacts on 
the regional economy. The EU is a critical market for Black Sea countries and its principal source 
of financing, lending, investment and official assistance. It is hence the most powerful influence 
on Black Sea regional cooperation, with EU measures sometimes dividing countries according to 
whether or not they are members, while at other times they facilitate increased cooperation under 
EU sponsored frameworks. A prolonged economic downturn in the EU will negatively affect growth 
prospects for the entire region, while a rapid recovery will be an undoubted boon. On balance 
though, the EU’s impact on regional cooperation in the Black Sea has been more detrimental than 
beneficial. This is mainly because, unlike in other regions, it has developed relations with countries 
bilaterally, without much regard for the implications for regional cooperation. 
Promoting regional cooperation is a basic challenge, as in times of economic crisis the tendency 
of states is to exert more national control and not to commit their resources for initiatives which 
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involve taking risks, trusting others, or pooling sovereignty. The downturn is thus an obstacle 
for new common regional initiatives, although there are certain instances where incentives to 
cooperate may increase, such as with initiatives that enhance economic security. These may involve 
reducing a country’s isolation or vulnerability, or sharing information and pooling resources in a 
way that provides insurance against shocks, speculative attacks and other destabilising economic 
events. 
The need to achieve sustainable economic development, meet a range of common challenges and 
the effort to mitigate the consequences of climate change can provide powerful incentives for joint 
action in a regional format. These should be exploited in order to generate complementarities 
within which economic cooperation at a regional level may develop despite the many divergences 
and different priorities of the states in question.
The importance of a regional dialogue on key sectors has been heightened by the financial crisis. 
These include banking and finance, transport, energy, telecommunications, trade facilitation and 
environmental protection. The use of the institutions and mechanisms of regional organisations 
like BSEC could provide much added value. Despite the crisis and its adverse implications, the 
Black Sea region enjoys a number of competitive advantages including its proximity to the wealthy 
markets of the EU, favourable business environments and a high quality of human capital, in terms 
of education and skills, at relatively low cost. The memories most countries of the region have of 
dealing with the crises of the 1990s indicate resilience, a wealth of experience upon which to draw 
and a greater degree of flexibility now in implementing policy responses.
The widely divergent economies of the region make the prospects for economic integration difficult, 
but deeper and more diversified cooperation is both possible and necessary. The importance of 
extending free trade agreements between the EU and those states of the region which want one, 
but do not yet have one, cannot be underestimated. 
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Democratic Institutions and Good 
Governance
The systemic divide of the Cold War era still weighs heavily across the lands of the Black Sea in the 
area of democracy and good governance. As a result, it is politically heterogeneous and home to many 
different legacies. The state of democracy varies between the fully fledged and various forms of semi-
authoritarian rule. The relative weakness of democratic institutions across the region can be explained 
by the limited history of democracy in the post-communist states, the absence in communist times 
of meaningful dissident movements, in contrast to the countries of central Europe, and the fact that 
citizens have little experience in exercising their political rights. Even the more mature, consolidated 
democracies of the region occasionally go through difficult periods of political readjustment. 
The revolutionary zeal of the “Orange” and “Rose” revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia have petered 
out with unfulfilled dreams of democratisation across the region and sharp criticism from Russia 
regarding western-led notions of “democracy promotion” as opposed to its own brand of “managed” 
or top-down democracy. The 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine are indicative of the need to 
promote a new discourse on democratisation.
The legacies of the past in the vast majority of the countries of the region imply a particular set of 
problems to overcome with regard to democracy. This is particularly the case for the four “small” 
states of the region – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. They have had to grapple not 
only with the question of how to develop into democracies and market economies but also with 
how to manage their difficult state and nation-building processes. The various unsettled disputes 
and protracted conflicts, (Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia,) attest to 
the difficulties they face. On the other hand, the evolution of the political system in Russia over 
the last decade has been characterised by an increasing recentralisation of political and economic 
power which paradoxically, albeit controversially and not without costs, may have prevented the 
country from experiencing further disintegration and brought about greater political and social 
stability. In the case of Ukraine, its transformation has been largely determined by the struggle 
between members of the old nomenklatura who kept their positions in the state administration and 
the economy and the rise of new elite groups seeking to challenge their power. 
The Black Sea region can be characterised by a series of challenges which compound the process 
of political transformation. With the exception of Greece and Turkey, democracy in the region is 
affected by the communist heritage where members of the old nomenklatura still exert significant 
political and economic power. The experience of organising effective party structures, formulating 
adequate electoral platforms and the art of political compromise is lacking. Most of the states of the 
region have weak and volatile party systems with highly fragmented oppositions. The intervention 
of oligarchs in politics is commonplace, as is clientelism. 
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The quality of democratic institutions is often questionable and horizontal and vertical 
accountability remains the principal challenge in the context of weak institutions, the widespread 
abuse of power, corruption and governmental control of the media. Developing democracies with 
these features are in constant danger of being captured by formal or informal interest groups 
without being adequately able to react to external shocks. They are thus in danger of falling into 
a perpetual state of instability. The challenges faced in these circumstances are pervasive. They 
concern elections, the quality of political parties and the proper functioning of national parliaments 
with requisite roles for both governments and oppositions. Accountable and transparent decision-
making processes where good governance is the rule of thumb are also brought into question as are 
independent, impartial, efficient and effective judiciaries. Likewise an independent media free of 
intimidation, the need for vigorous civil society organisations and the influence of interest groups 
are issues of concern. All of these, to varying degrees, are problematic in all Black Sea states.
The other particular feature of the region which can affect democratisation is the persistence 
of minority problems in most countries. By contrast, the emergence of a new generation of 
western educated technocrats in the political arena in some countries is a positive development. 
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the overwhelming number of issues linked to political 
transformation processes is resulting in growing voter discontent and distrust in the performance 
of their democracies. Also of concern is the growing inequality between rich and poor. Mounting 
welfare and income disparities discredit the transformation to democracy and market economies in 
the sense that they seem to favour the lot of political and economic elites instead of the nation as a 
whole. The current global economic crisis has only served to exacerbate this feeling of inequality 
thus undermining yet further the credibility of democratic values and stable good governance. 
The rise of nationalism and populism in Europe and the Black Sea region are also damaging the 
standing of democracy. 
Other related dimensions are the role and impact of stakeholders such as the EU, the United 
States and international organisations such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe, all of which 
are champions of democratisation. Their influence to date has been weak and patchy as, in certain 
places, it clashes directly with Russia’s perception that it holds a droit de regard over its wider 
neighbourhood.
In the longer run, to minimise divisions both within states and between them, it is necessary for 
all of the countries of the region to embrace all aspects of good governance, such as participatory 
democracy, the rule of law, transparency, accountability and efficiency.
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Regional Cooperation
The underlying idea of regional cooperation is that it assumes that each country can obtain 
additional benefits above and beyond what it might gain through independent action. It takes into 
account both the commonalities and differences between states in a particular geographic location 
in order to be coherent, useful and effective. In the Black Sea, regionalism has taken off since the 
end of the Cold War, thanks to numerous local and external factors. These include globalisation, 
the systemic changes of the post-Cold War era, NATO’s open-door policy and EU enlargement, the 
political and economic transitions of the countries of the region and the international security 
context. As a result, Black Sea regional cooperation reflects the complex security and socio-
economic circumstances of the area and the competing policies and priorities of its stakeholders. 
The process of European integration also casts a long shadow and fundamentally impacts the 
progress of cooperation in the Black Sea.
The Black Sea region is crammed with numerous regional structures and programmes that have 
appeared since the end of the Cold War, (see Annex I). These include political and economic 
organisations such as BSEC, GUAM, the CDC and the Black Sea Forum. There are also EU-led or 
initiated programmes such as the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA), the Danube 
Black Sea Task Force (DABLAS) and the Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe (INOGATE) 
which cover transport, water and energy respectively. Then there are the wider EU policies such 
as the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership. Thus 
one might be forgiven for thinking that the region is a hive of international activity reflecting its 
strategic, economic and political relevance. In fact this proliferation of organisations must be seen 
against a backdrop of overlapping agendas, regional rivalry and tense bilateral relations coupled with 
insufficient institutional capacity for undertaking major projects of regional importance.
BSEC is a prime example. In spite of permanent structures such as a secretariat, a development 
bank, a parliamentary assembly, a business council, a think tank and thematic working groups, it 
suffers from a number of deficiencies such as slow decision-making, a shortage of funds, a lack of 
qualified expert staff and the limited participation of private sector and civil society actors. 
Moreover, the initiatives that do originate within the region are usually ignored by other 
stakeholders and donors, most notably, the EU. Finally the extent to which any regionally originated 
initiatives actually fit together well and how they synchronise with global trends and developments 
is difficult to ascertain.
Most of the states of the region also participate in many of these processes and initiatives 
simultaneously. This causes policy confusion, a waste of resources and a reduced potential to build 
capacity in strategic policy areas such as trade, environment, energy, transport and science and 
technology amongst others.
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The fact that many of the states prioritise their own institution building processes, to the exclusion 
of constructive and parallel region building, ultimately undermines the development of the latter 
and detracts from the long term benefits of the former. There is no clear understanding that national 
priorities are reinforced by regional interests. Thus a commitment to serving the collective good of 
the region is missing and needs to be addressed. This is made worse by the growing influence of 
the EU. As the centre of gravity increasingly shifts in the direction of Brussels, this simultaneously 
weakens the potential for more cooperation between the countries of the Black Sea but can also 
provide new opportunities for joint efforts for those countries that are able and willing to do so.
These concerns underline the need to increase awareness within the region about the importance and 
relevance of multilateral cooperation including a renewed effort to identify and implement projects of 
long-term and significant mutual benefit. Thus the fostering of sustained development through regional 
cooperation can only be addressed through the setting of agreed goals and objectives. The generation of 
resources so that projects are funded from within, as opposed to their exclusive financing from external 
sources, including the EU, as is often the case, is important. A dependence on this funding blurs the 
core purpose of regional cooperation and discourages the involvement of local actors.
The prioritisation of regional policies is thus vital. This means focusing on sectors that have a truly 
regional character which necessitate a high level of interaction between state, regional, local and 
non-state actors and that are of a cross-border nature. Given the growing impact and involvement 
of the EU, an important precondition is a proper policy mix between the approach of the local 
stakeholders and the EU. Above all an understanding between the EU and Russia to ensure the 
success of regional cooperation is a prerequisite for effective partnerships. So is an emphasis 
on local ownership, results-oriented priorities, the coordination of existing initiatives and the 
establishment of trust and confidence-building measures.
Finally, other relevant concerns include overall policy coordination and coherence, the strengthening 
of existing institutions through necessary technical and financial capacity-building assistance and 
the carrying out of feasibility studies and cost benefit analyses with regard to specific projects in 
order to generate interest and sound policies. 
BSEC, for all its weaknesses though, has not been given its due credit despite the fact that it possesses all 
the right tools and elements to be the overarching regional framework for cooperation. This is in contrast 
to other regional forums which also possess institutions but whose membership is limited and which 
also suffer from a lack of political support. The inclusive nature of BSEC is linked to its comprehensive 
institutional structures which assure a focus on relevant thematic issues. Although it avoids addressing 
security issues as such, it should be noted that these are dealt with in the context of its parliamentary 
assembly and its related research centre. However a serious issue that needs consideration is the top-down, 
strictly intergovernmental nature of the organisation and the inability or unwillingness of its stakeholders 
to give it any autonomy or open it up to the initiatives of civil society or the business community. 
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The Black Sea region’s state of play and its increased relevance to various stakeholders suggests 
that much needs to be done to ensure that it evolves peacefully and constructively and that it 
becomes a reliable community that poses no threat to itself or to its neighbours. This in turn 
implies an emphasis on security concerns, sustainable development, regional cooperation and good 
governance. What comes as a surprise perhaps is that the tools needed to address these challenges 
already exist. These include regional organisations, financial institutions geared towards the region 
and many already existing policies and initiatives. 
A major drawback is an across-the-board lack of political support and understanding, within the 
region and internationally, of the already existing processes of regional cooperation. The analysis 
provided by this report finds that regional cooperation is fundamental if we are to achieve security, 
stability and economic and social development. Regional cooperation is not an end in and of itself 
but rather a gradual and multifaceted process which is long-term in scope. By its very nature, it 
brings state and non-state actors together in a way which takes us towards this goal. In the short 
term though, the focus should be on well defined problems, yielding visible results, which can be 
seen and felt by ordinary people.
Current attempts at policy coordination in the Black Sea region, embodied in several regional 
institutions and multilateral forums, fail to deliver substantive results. A persuasive indicator of 
political commitment to constructive regionalism is the willingness of participating countries to 
allocate resources, commensurate with their possibilities, to regional projects and to build the 
required capacity for the joint administration of those resources. However, failure or the endless 
delaying of cooperation bears with it costs for the people of the region. These include adverse 
economic effects and obstacles to free trade which in turn slow growth and welfare. 
The composition of the Black Sea region is highly diversified in terms of the size and power of its 
countries, their systems of governance, the sophistication of their economic and financial structures 
and human development indicators. Considering such diversity, it is difficult to create comprehensive 
regional integration schemes in the conventional sense, at least in the short term. This should not 
however, be an obstacle to broad ranging cooperation but rather an incentive to creative thinking and 
pragmatic action. It is realistic for the Black Sea to become a model for new and imaginative types 
of positive relationships which bind rather than divide in a region that has been fragmented for far 
too long. The best way to achieve this is in a multilateral and regional format. Setting up or bolstering 
existing regional frameworks for policy coordination among stakeholders that would ultimately reduce 
instability does not have to entail immense political or financial costs. It would though, require a change 
in the mind-set of policy makers to comprehend the value of regional approaches to policy making.
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Around the Black Sea, there are two opposing conditions that affect the potential of regionalism. 
On the one hand, economic difficulties and the need for managing regional public goods such as 
the environment, trade and financial stability have generated demands for regional cooperation, 
integration and policy coordination. These need to be strengthened and efficiently channelled 
into regional policy making. On the other hand, important security issues such as the unresolved 
secessionist conflicts undermine the drive for regionalism and obstruct collective action and 
institutions. These adverse security conditions need to be eliminated or their impacts reduced.
The role of the EU is key. Three of the states of the Black Sea, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania, are EU 
member states while Turkey is negotiating its accession. The impact of the EU is extremely high 
as its power of attraction and policies such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Black Sea 
Synergy and the Eastern Partnership, target Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, 
while it has a strategic partnership with Russia. The EU has also become, for those states of the 
region which are not members, their most important economic partner. For most of them it is 
becoming a catalyst of social and political change too. There is thus a need to clarify the Union’s 
status with regard to the formulation of regional policies and outputs. 
It is the view of the Commission that the primary responsibility for articulating a clear and 
coherent vision of what the Black Sea region should look like in ten years time rests with the 
regional actors themselves. If they prove to be unable or unwilling to do so, it is to be expected 
that the geopolitical forces now at play will continue to pursue their respective, and not necessarily 
convergent, agendas. This is not an attractive proposition for the stability, security and prosperity 
of the region. Where a regional initiative does not attract the interest of all participants, the wish 
of certain members or sub-groupings to coordinate and cooperate should be respected by others, 
insofar as such cooperation is not directed against the non-participants. Those who do not take part 
should not prevent others from going ahead, and in turn the participants should leave the door 
open for them to join at a later stage.
All the Commission’s recommendations are meant to mobilise international and local interest 
in the Black Sea region. The current conjunction of developments including the global financial 
crisis, the post-August 2008 setting and the discussion of a new European security architecture, 
should be seen as a wakeup call that the region is in need of serious attention and concerted action. 
The focus here is on a select number of recommendations which the Commission feels should 
generate support in order to enhance the profile of the wider Black Sea region and to contribute to 
its regional appeal. This set of recommendations makes no claim to be exhaustive, but we hope it 
will serve as a point of departure for further discussion.
Policy Recommendations
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2020 Vision – A Black Sea Dimension 
The setting of consensus targets for the region is important. We should work towards proposing 
mid-term recommendations with 2020 in sight. We assume that by then, the countries of the 
Western Balkans will have become EU members, that there should be a clearer picture regarding 
Turkey’s membership and debate on which, if any, of the other countries of the region will join, 
will have crystallised. This would entail the creation, by the countries and actors of the region, of a 
new overarching concept and policy; a Black Sea Dimension. The aim of this would be to promote 
regional cooperation while anticipating changes in the neighbourhood. The necessity of thinking 
about a new concept for the region is only underscored by the fact that most existing ideas and 
policies for and about the Black Sea were conceived before the August 2008 war. The Dimension 
should also take into consideration ongoing discussions regarding a new European security 
framework. The 2020 Vision needs to be developed into a clear strategy which should mark the 
culmination of several linked initiatives. 
Enhance the profile of Black Sea regionalism
The first chapter in the history of BSEC has ended but a new one has not yet been properly opened. 
It is in need of rejuvenation. Preparations should begin without delay for a summit in 2012 to mark 
the 20th anniversary of the organisation. This must not be a mere festive occasion. It should be an 
opportunity to renew the commitment of its members to regional cooperation and to inaugurate 
an overhauled BSEC in order to make it a more relevant regional organisation with greater clout. 
Such steps, which should be in line with other international commitments undertaken by BSEC 
member states, could include:
•  Setting specific targets and deadlines for the development of a system of legally binding 
commitments and implementation mechanisms. These should cover the main areas of BSEC 
concern where a regional approach provides value added compared to the individual efforts of 
member states.
•  Agreeing on a substantial augmentation of the BSEC budget, based on proportional 
contributions, in order to enable BSEC to co-finance major projects of regional interest. This 
could also be done through the creation of specific funds, similar to the Hellenic Development 
Fund. The resources of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank should be harnessed for 
this. 
•  Adding a specific security dimension to BSEC activities, relying mainly on confidence-building 
measures and increased transparency. 
•  Developing an inclusive mechanism for regular consultation and coordination between BSEC 
and all the other regional organisations and initiatives, (governmental and non-governmental,) 
as well as with “extra-regional” partners.
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•  All members should undertake to actually devote, as opposed to just declaring that they will, at 
least one cabinet meeting a year to an examination of Black Sea regional cooperation matters 
and to report accordingly to their parliaments as well as to the BSEC parliamentary assembly.
•  BSEC’s rebirth, expanded role and enhanced regional relevance should be symbolised by giving 
it a new name. A region-wide awareness raising competition could be opened for everyone in 
the region to suggest what it might be and also to design a new logo and flag for it. 
Deal with the conflicts – Start real security dialogue and confidence-building 
measures 
As part of our 2020 Vision we see an urgent need to tackle the protracted conflicts and other 
outstanding issues of the region. The Commission proposes to establish a high level consultative 
group in order to assess the issues and search for solutions. The group should eventually suggest 
ways to provide international guarantees for the implementation of any peace agreements. In the 
interim it should propose confidence-building measures in order to mitigate the corrosive impact 
of the conflicts on the goal and vision of putting the whole Black Sea region at a qualitatively 
new level. The feasibility of an international gathering, preferably at a summit level, involving 
the Black Sea states and international stakeholders should be the end point for any or all of these 
processes. 
There is a need for the region’s stakeholders to contribute to the ongoing debate about a new 
security architecture for Europe, as this discussion has immediate ramifications for the Black 
Sea which could be described as the shared neighbourhood of both the EU and Russia. As part 
of this discussion, a renewed assessment of already existing mechanisms, such as the OSCE or 
the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE treaty), and agreed upon measures under such 
mechanisms, is needed. Within this context, the Commission proposes a number of confidence-
building measures from hotlines between foreign ministers to regular meetings of senior officials 
of the foreign and defence ministries of the region in order to stress the need for regional solutions 
to regional problems. Establishing a structured security dialogue on relevant issues ranging from 
civil protection to coordination regarding man-made or natural disasters, migration and organised 
crime would be a valuable addition.
Focus on economic issues that meet common challenges and real needs
Promote the principles of sustainable development as the guiding philosophy of regional 
cooperation in the Black Sea area. In this way we should seek to restore and preserve a rational and 
enduring equilibrium between economic development and the integrity of the natural environment 
in ways that society can understand and accept. Rational responses to the consequences of climate 
change and the responsible use of natural, human and societal resources are essential components 
of such a development model, which should be translated into coherent policies at national and 
regional level. Human and knowledge capital should be considered an integral part of a sustainable 
development model. 
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Since the on-going global financial and economic crisis has severely affected most countries in 
the Black Sea region, it is essential to supplement the mitigation measures taken in each country 
with a concerted regional approach to post-crisis recovery programmes relying on the concept of 
sustainable development. 
Since economies are increasingly interlinked, decisions or actions in one country often 
impact neighbouring states, thus creating common challenges which require cooperation and 
communication. The basis for such cooperation may entail undertaking new initiatives to create 
physical linkages, for example cross-country infrastructure and institutional linkages. These could 
include policy coordination and harmonisation, cross-country regulation, enhanced information 
sharing in order to stimulate growth and overlapping activities. Alternatively, the basis of 
cooperation may be economic security oriented, in the sense of avoiding misunderstandings or 
undertaking policies which may have adverse “beggar thy neighbour” impacts. Cooperation could 
also aim to mitigate the negative effects of economic downturns, to pool information or resources 
to create early warning systems or reciprocal assistance mechanisms or to reduce the vulnerability 
of countries to crises in the future and to devising forms of insurance. The key is for cooperation 
to meet real and identified needs which have tangible, achievable solutions and appropriate cost 
benefit ratios.
Take policy measures to improve the business environment and to facilitate greater economic 
activity across borders. These should include concrete steps to facilitate business activity by 
removing various non-tariff barriers that hinder trade, investment or financing. This may be done 
by agreements relating to specific activities, for example customs procedures and visas or in the 
form of a comprehensive trade facilitation deal. 
Conduct regular policy dialogues between relevant officials concerned with important sectors of 
the economy that would benefit from cooperation such as finance, transport, energy, environment, 
fisheries and so on. 
Promote and coordinate regional cooperation schemes at all levels
Any examination of work done on the region shows that numerous schemes, programmes and 
initiatives, whether governmental or non-governmental, not-for profit, EU-led or with a thematic 
focus have been actively promoting regional cooperation for years. Annex I is indicative of this. 
However, the need to make this work more visible and coordinated is necessary if the potential of 
the Black Sea, as a region, is to be fully unleashed.
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There is also a need to move beyond the top-down approach promoted by organisations such as 
BSEC and others, to assure that civil society plays a role in the development of the region. If we are 
to assume that civil society refers to uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes 
and values, there is much to be gained from the greater involvement of the business sector at 
national and regional levels, NGOs, women’s groups and youth in Black Sea regional activities.
Identifying issues which could be better addressed regionally rather than nationally is a priority. 
Doing this would serve as a good tool for coordination between institutions and programmes with 
a regional cooperation dimension. Working on this could also help draw in all relevant actors in 
the fields of their concern. The selection of key subjects which need addressing would also assist 
donors, governments and investors in deciding on their funding priorities. Lessons should be drawn 
from the experiences of other areas which have faced or are dealing with similar issues, such as 
the Baltic, the Balkans, the Danube region and so on. 
Promote intercultural dialogue
A clear encouragement and sponsorship of intercultural dialogue among the peoples of the Black 
Sea would support regional cooperation. A useful example that could serve as an inspiration and 
model is the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures which 
is based in Alexandria in Egypt and operates within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. Another reference is the Alliance of Civilizations which was established in 2005, at 
the initiative of the governments of Spain and Turkey, under the auspices of the United Nations. 
Similar models should be encouraged at the sub-regional level. Intercultural dialogue should be 
promoted hand in hand with interfaith dialogue, aimed at bringing together the religious leaders of 
the region’s confessions. Cooperation between universities should be enhanced as should student 
exchange programmes in order to create linkages and networks between young people of the Black 
Sea. A joint Black Sea Studies graduate programme needs to be established between the region’s 
universities in order to create academic linkages for the future. In terms of the media there are few 
foreign correspondents from Black Sea countries reporting on events in one another’s countries. 
This means that what news there is often comes from external sources not well attuned to the 
interests of their readers or viewers. Funds should be found to address this problem. 
Promote the targeted training of professional groups
There is a need for the targeted training of public servants, diplomats, young leaders, 
parliamentarians and business leaders throughout the region. This should aim to improve the 
number of well trained individuals at the service of their countries. However, above and beyond 
that, training people together is a way to promote the cooperation of local public officials and 
others on issues of common concerns, such as the environment, which contribute to regional 
development. The creation of a Black Sea Training Academy for example, would help streamline 
such a process. 
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Promote good governance, civil society and social dialogue 
The involvement of civil society in policy making is linked to good governance and solid institution 
building, which all countries in the region have signed up to through their membership of the 
Council of Europe. Programmes should be implemented such that a focus on civil society is 
enhanced. Efforts should be made to encourage cooperation between civil society organisations in 
Black Sea countries including the conflict regions. More funds should be devoted to programmes 
and projects encouraging active and professional involvement of civil society in policy making 
throughout the region. Countries should take practical steps in developing e-government services 
both on national and regional levels. Business organisations such as chambers of commerce and 
employers’ organisations and trade unions should also be encouraged to talk to one another in order 
to find and propose regional solutions for regional problems. One idea could be the creation of a 
cooperation council for business organisations and chambers of commerce under the aegis of the 
renewed BSEC enhancing the scope of the already existing BSEC Business Council.
The Commission believes in the potential of the Black Sea, its people and governments. We 
believe that our recommendations can serve as a means to begin to release it.
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The Black Sea in Figures
Name Est. Type Member States / Parties Goals / Activities
The Organisation of the 
Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC)
1992 Regional  
economic  
organisation
Initiating party: Turkey
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,  
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece,  
Moldova, Romania, Russia,  
Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.
Foster regional cooperation through its sectoral working groups: 
Agriculture; Banking & Finance; Combating Crime; Culture; Customs 
Matters; Emergency Assistance; Education; Energy; Environmental 
Protection; Exchange of Statistical Data & Information; Healthcare  
& Pharmaceutics; Information & Communication Technologies;  
Institutional Renewal & Good Governance; Science & Technology; 
SMEs; Tourism; Trade & Economic Development; Transport.
Related Bodies / Affiliated Centres of the BSEC:
1. BSEC Business Council 1992 International 
non-governmen-
tal, non-profit 
organisation
National organisations  
representing the business 
communities of Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, 
Greece, Moldova, Romania,  
Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.
Lobby and act for the continuous improvement of the business and 
investment environment; provide a forum for a dialogue between 
the private and public sectors; help attract Foreign Direct Investment 
to the region; help enhance the competitiveness of SMEs through 
management training; develop joint cooperation projects; collect 
and disseminate statistical data and information on business  
conditions and business opportunities in the region.
2. Black Sea Trade and 
Development Bank 
(BSTDB)
1997 International 
financial  
institution
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece,  
Moldova, Romania, Russia,  
Turkey and Ukraine.
Accelerate development and promote cooperation between its share- 
holder countries; support regional trade and investment, providing 
financing for commercial transactions and projects in order to help 
member states to establish stronger economic linkages.
3. International Centre for 
Black Sea Studies (ICBSS)
1998 Independent 
research and 
training  
institution
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,  
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece,  
Moldova, Romania, Russia,  
Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.
Foster multilateral cooperation among the BSEC member states as 
well as with their international partners; strives to pursue applied, 
policy-oriented research, build capacity and promote knowledge on 
the Black Sea region; tries to fulfil in the best possible way its  
institutional role and the assignments received by carrying out 
studies, offering policy advice and coordinating activities.
4. Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Organization of the 
BSEC (PABSEC)
1993 Parliamentary 
assembly
76 parliamentarians from Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,  
Georgia, Greece, Moldova,  
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey 
and Ukraine.
Provide a legal basis for economic, commercial, social, cultural 
and political cooperation among the member countries; to enact 
legislation needed for the implementation of decisions taken by the 
heads of state or government or by the ministers of foreign affairs; 
to provide assistance to national parliaments so as to strengthen 
parliamentary democracy; to promote cooperation with other  
international and regional organisations.
Other Regional Organisations and Initiatives:
Black Sea Association of 
National News Agencies 
(BSANNA)
2006 International 
association
AzerTAj (Azerbaijan), ANA (Greece), 
Armenpress (Armenia), Anadolu 
Agency (Turkey), ATA (Albania), 
BTA (Bulgaria), ITAR-TASS (Russia), 
Caucasus-Press (Georgia),  
Moldrpres (Moldova), AGERPRES 
(Romania), Tanjug (Serbia), MIA 
(FYROM), HINA (Croatia), GHN 
(Georgia) and Ukrinform (Ukraine).
Promote friendship and good neighbourly relations; strengthen 
mutual respect and trust among the agencies; freely and equally 
exchange information to facilitate its dissemination.
Black Sea Euroregion 2008 Regional  
initiative
Initiating parties: Romania, 
Bulgaria
City of Idjevan; Municipalities of 
Bourgas, Nessebar, Shabla, Varna, 
Braila, Constanta, and Mangalia; 
Autonomous Republic of Adjara; 
Region of Cahul; Counties of Braila, 
Constanta, Galati and Tulcea.
Develop cooperation among its members, to represent and support 
their common interests and to cooperate with the existing Black Sea 
international organisations.
ANNEX I: Regional Organisations and Initiatives
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Black Sea Littoral States 
Border / Coast Guard 
Cooperation Forum
2000 International 
forum
Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, 
Turkey and Ukraine.
Enhance peace, stability and maritime security in the Black Sea 
area by increasing regional cooperation and improve working 
relationships.
Black Sea Forum for  
Dialogue and Partnership
2006 Regional  
platform
Initiating party: Romania
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,  
Georgia, Greece, Moldova,  
Romania, Turkey and Ukraine.
Foster greater synergy among international and regional organisations 
to create political preconditions for the success of regional cooperation 
projects; shaping a common vision and setting a common agenda.
Promote good governance, strengthening of tolerance and non-
discrimination, civil society capacity-building, empowerment of youth 
through provision of better education and research opportunities, with 
a view to creating a regional environment conducive to the promotion 
of democracy and fundamental rights and freedoms.
Identify regional means and capabilities that can be mobilised to 
ensure sustainable development through more effective regional 
cooperation and highlighting the role and active involvement of the 
business community to this end.
Encourage regional cooperation by pooling relevant national  
experiences and best practices in crisis management, civil emergency 
planning, post-conflict reconstruction and environmental protection, 
putting regional priorities in harmony with European and Euro- 
Atlantic developments in these areas.
Black Sea Naval 
Cooperation Task Group 
(BLACKSEAFOR)
2001 Regional 
multinational 
maritime force
Initiating party: Turkey  
Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, 
Turkey and Ukraine.
Search and Rescue (SAR) operations; humanitarian assistance (HA); 
mine counter measures (MCM); environmental protection; goodwill 
visits; any other tasks agreed by all the parties.
Black Sea NGO Forum 2008 Non- 
governmental  
Organisation 
forum
100 NGOs from Armenia,  
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria,  
Georgia, Greece, Moldova,  
Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine 
and other EU member states.
Increase the level of dialogue and cooperation among NGOs in the 
wider Black Sea region, as a means of strengthening NGOs and 
their capacity to influence regional and national policies.
Black Sea Synergy 2007 EU regional 
cooperation 
policy
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,  
Moldova, Russia, Turkey and 
Ukraine.
Stimulate democratic and economic reforms; support stability 
and promote development; focus on practical projects in areas of 
common concern; respond to opportunities and challenges through 
coordinated action in a regional framework; develop a climate more 
conducive to the solution of conflicts in the region.
Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS)
1991 Regional   
organisation
Initiating party: Russia
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus,  
Georgia (until 17.08.09),  
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Ukraine.
Create an economic union and form a common economic space 
grounded on free movement of goods, services, labour and capital; 
to elaborate a coordinated monetary, tax, price, customs and 
external economic policy; to bring together methods of regulating 
economic activity and to create favourable conditions for the  
development of direct production relations.
Community of Democratic 
Choice (CDC)
2005 Intergovern-
mental  
organisation
Initiating parties: Georgia, Ukraine
Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, 
FYROM, Moldova, Romania,  
Slovenia and Ukraine.
Promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO)
1992 
(as the 
Colle-
ctive 
Security 
Treaty)/ 
2002
International 
organisation
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan.
Strengthen peace and international and regional security and 
stability and to ensure the collective defence of the independence, 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member states, in the  
attainment of which the member states shall give priority to  
political measures.
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Harvard Black Sea  
Security Studies  
Programme
2001 Academic 
programme
Senior military representatives and 
civilian security specialists from 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,  
Georgia, Greece, Moldova,  
Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine 
and the United States.
Deepen participants’ understanding of global and regional strategy, 
defence organisation, military reform and restructuring; identify the 
very broad common areas of agreement that exist among the Black 
Sea nations and expose their officials and US participants to the 
strong common history and shared values of the region; highlight 
the specific areas of current cooperation on issues of vital interest 
to these countries and, at the same time, identify those issues which 
divide them and present challenges to regional cooperation; expose 
Black Sea officials to the free flow of ideas inherent in the pluralistic 
American system and within the US national security community 
itself by engaging them with policy makers who represent a wide 
range of viewpoints.
International Federation 
for Sustainable  
Development and Fight 
Against Poverty in the  
Mediterranean-Black Sea
2004 International 
association
Various institutions from: Albania, 
Algeria, Armenia, Belgium, Bosnia 
& Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Egypt, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Luxembourg, FYROM, Malta,  
Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia,  
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,  
Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom and the 
United States.
Better management of water and its demand; an increased rational  
use of energy drawing on renewable sources; supporting  
sustainable mobility through appropriate transport management;  
assuring sustainable tourism that may also become a leading  
economic sector; guaranteeing sustainable agricultural and  
rural development; furnishing incentives for sustainable urban  
development; favouring sustainable development of the sea and  
its coastal zones.
Interstate Oil and Gas 
Transportation to Europe 
(INOGATE)
1995 Programme Initiating party: EU
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkey,  
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan.
Support the development of energy cooperation between the  
European Union, the littoral states of the Black and Caspian Seas 
and their neighbouring countries.
Kyiv Initiative 2005 Council of  
Europe initiative
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine.
Show the added value of coordinated and inter-disciplinary planning 
across a range of key functions, including heritage and environmental 
protection, tourism, cultural development, education and economic 
development.
Operation Black Sea 
Harmony
2004 Naval operation Initiating party: Turkey
Turkey, Russia, Ukraine and 
Romania.
Increase shipping security along the Black Sea coast and track 
suspicious ships.
Organization for  
Democracy and Economic 
Development – GUAM 
(ODED-GUAM)
2001 Regional  
organisation
Initiating parties: Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan 
and Moldova (initially including 
Uzbekistan).
Strengthen trade and economic ties; develop transport and  
communication arteries; strengthen regional security; interact in  
the framework of international organisations; fight international  
terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking.
South Caucasus Anti-
Drugs Programme (SCAD)
2001 Programme Initiating party: EU
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.
Exchange drug epidemiology/information; legal assistance; prevention 
of drug use; treatment for drug addicts; regional law enforcement 
trainings.
South East European  
Co-operation Process 
(SEECP)
1996 Non-institutio-
nalised regional 
cooperation 
structure
Initiating party: Bulgaria
Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, FYROM, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, 
Serbia and Turkey.
Promote good-neighbourly relations; stability; security; cooperation in 
South East Europe.
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Southeast European  
Cooperative Initiative 
(SECI)
1995 Regional  
organisation
Initiating party: OSCE
Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, 
FYROM, Moldova, Montenegro, Ro-
mania, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey.
Combat and improve coordination against trans-border crime in
South East Europe.
The Baku Initiative 2004 Policy dialogue 
on Energy and 
Transport
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bulgaria, Ge-
orgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
Integrate energy markets of the participating countries, in order to 
guarantee transparency and to also give an impulse to Trans-European 
transport cooperation on the basis of the mutual interest for the 
progressive integration of their respective transport networks and 
markets in accordance with EU and international legal and regulatory 
frameworks.
The Black Sea NGO  
Network (BSNN)
1998 Regional  
association
Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, 
Turkey and Ukraine.
Protect the environment, democratic values and good practices.
The Commission on the 
Protection of the Black Sea 
Against Pollution (the Black 
Sea Commission or BSC)
1992 Intergovernmen-
tal organisation
Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, 
Turkey and Ukraine.
Combat pollution from land-based sources and maritime transport; 
achieve sustainable management of marine living resources; pursue 
sustainable human development.
The Danube Black Sea Task 
Force (DABLAS)
2001 Cooperation 
programme
Austria, Bosnia & Herzegovina,  
Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Germany,  
Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Russia,  
Serbia, Montenegro, Slovakia,  
Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, the Interna-
tional Commission for the Protection 
ofthe River Danube (ICPDR), the 
Black Sea Commission, International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs), the EC, 
other bilateral donors, other regio-
nal / international organisations with 
relevant functions.
Provide a platform for cooperation for the protection of water and 
water related ecosystems of the wider Black Sea region, (the entire 
Black Sea basin including all tributaries).
The Black Sea Trust for 
Regional Cooperation 
(BST) – a project of the 
German Marshall Fund of 
the United States
2007 Public-private 
partnership
Main recipients can be located in  
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, 
Ukraine and Russia (the oblasts of 
Krasnodar and Rostov).
Rebuild trust in public institutions; to affirm the value of citizen 
participation in the democratic process; to strengthen a critical set of 
institutions that lie at the nexus of state and society; to foster regional, 
cross-border ties in the public, private and non-profit sectors.
Transport Corridor Europe-
Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA)
1993 Intergovernmen-
tal programme
Initiating party: EU
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Turkey, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan.
Stimulate cooperation among the participating states in all matters 
related to the development and improvement of trade in the region; 
promoting optimal integration of the international transport corridor 
Europe-Caucasus-Asia ‘TRACECA’ into Trans-European Networks 
(TENs); identifying problems and deficiencies in the region’s trade 
and transport systems; promoting TRACECA projects as a means to 
attract funding from IFIs, development partners and private investors; 
defining, in terms of contents and timing, a Technical Assistance 
Programme to be financed by the European Commission.
United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP): 
Black Sea Trade and 
Investment Promotion 
Programme (BSTIP)
2007 Intergovernmen-
tal initiative
Greece, Turkey, BSEC and UNDP. Develop networking arrangements; supporting the introduction of  
the Global Compact in the sub-region; building capacity in EU and 
WTO legislation.
Union of Black Sea and 
Caspian Confederation of 
Enterprises (UBCCE)
2007 International 
union
National organisations from:  
Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbai-
jan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
FYROM, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Romania, 
Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.
Enhance economic cooperation.
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Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Conscription 
(months)
24 No No 18 9 12 No 12 15
12 (Army / AF)
18 (Navy)
Capabilities
Active 42,080 66,940 40,747 21,150 156,600 6,000 73,200 1,027,000 510,600 129,925
Army 38,945 56,840 18,773 17,767 93,500 5,150 43,000 360,000 402,000 70,753
Army Professionals 13,840 14,000 57,970 1,671 170,000 77,000
Conscripts 25,105 3,767 35,530 3,479 190,000 325,000
Airborne - - - - - - - 35,000 - -
Navy - 2,200 4,100 495 20,000 - 6,500 142,000 48,600 13,932
Professionals - 16,000 - 14,100 11,932
Conscripts - 4,000 - 34,500 2,000
Coast Guard - - - (2,200)2 -
Marines - - - (3,100)2 -
Naval Aviation - - - - (2,500)2
Naval Infantry - - - - (3,000)2
Air Force 2,220 7,900 9,344 1,310 31,500 850 10,200 160,000 60,000 45,240
Professionals 20,500
Conscripts 11,000
Strategic Deterrent 
Forces
- - - - - - - 80,000 - -
Command and 
Support
- -  -  -  - - - 250,000 - -
Joint 915  -  -  - 11,600  - 13,500 -  - -
Space Forces  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 40,000  -  -
National Guard  -  -  - 1,578  -  -  -  -  -  -
Central Staff  -  - 8,530  -  -  -  -  - -  -
Paramilitary3 4,748 15,000 34,000 11,700 4,000 2,379 79,900 449,000 102,200 84,900
Reserve 210,000 300,000 302,500  - 237,500 66,000 45,000 20,000,000 378,700 1,000,000
Army 250,500  - 163,500  - 258,700  -
Navy 7,500  - 8,000  - 55,000  -
Air 45,000  - 31,500  - 65,000  -
Paramilitary3  -  -  -  - 50,000  -
National Guard - - 34,500 - -
Joint - - - 66,000 - 1,000,000
Table I: Military Capacities and Reserves of the Black Sea Region States
Source: Hackett, J., ed. The Military Balance 2009 (London: IISS, 2009). (2) Included in “Navy” (3) Depending on the country, it might refer to Coast Guard Riot Police, Border Police, etc.
ANNEX II: Military Balance in the Black Sea Region
The Black Sea in Figures
50
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Main Battle Tanks 110 320 1,474 53 1,620 - 316 23,000 4,205 2,984
Light Tanks - - - - - - - 150 - -
Reconnaissance (Recce) - - 18 - 242 - - 2,000+ 250+ 600+
Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles 104 127 214 77 377 44 49 15,140+ 650 3,028
Armoured Personnel Carrier 136 468 2,409 32 2,105 315 1073 9,900+ 3,643 1,432
Artillery 229 282 1,666 236 3,163 148 838 26,121+ 7,450+ 3,351
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) - - - - 12–18 - - N/A 215+ -
Aircraft - - - - 43 - - - 168 -
Helicopters - - - - 161 - - 1278 280 177
Table II: Comparison of the Black Sea Region‘s Armies
Source: Hackett, J., ed. The Military Balance 2009 (London: IISS, 2009).
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
BS Fleet Total 1
Submarines  -  - 1  - 10 -  - 1 67 14 1
Principal Surface Combatants  -  - 4  - 17 - 7 11 43 23 4
Frigates  -  - 4  - 14  - 3 8 21 23 1
Corvettes  -  - -  - 3  - 4  - 2  - 3
Aircraft carriers  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 1  -  -
Destroyers  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 1 15  -  -
Cruisers  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 2 4  -  -
Patrol and Coastal Combatants  - 5 19 4 40  - 17 10 72 43 5
Mine Warfare  - 2 17  - 11  - 11 7 46 22 4
Logistic and Support  - 1 14  - 21  - 11 90 + 422 + 49 36
Amphibious  - 5 8 2 64  -  - 7 26 46 3
Naval Aviation            
Aircraft - - - - 8 (2) 2 6  - 36 314 (245) 3 7 26 (10) 3
Helicopters - - 6 (3) 4 - 21 (11) 5 6  - 42 342 21 77
Naval Infantry 
Armoured Personnel Carrier - - - - - - 16 - - - -
Armoured Combat Vehicle - - - - - - - 59 488 - -
Artillery - - - - - - - 14 58 - -
Strategic Deterrent Forces
Submarines 15
Table III: Comparison of the Black Sea Region‘s Navies
Source: Hackett, J., ed. The Military Balance 2009 (London: IISS, 2009). (1) Incl. the Northern Fleet, the Russian Pacific Fleet, the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Russian Baltic Fleet, and the Russian Caspian 
Flotilla (2) support aircraft (3) combat capable (4) operative (5) attacking
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Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Aircraft (combat capable) 22 (16) 102 (47) 116 (80) 27 (8) 275 (271) 6 125 (72) 2222 (1859) 753 (435) 299 (211)
Helicopters 33 35 47 33 - 6 67 60 40 38
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle - 4 1 - - - 65 - 18 -
Air Support Command
Aircraft 39
Helicopters 34
Air Training Command
Aircraft 104
Strategic Deterrent Forces
Aircraft 90
Table IV: Comparison of the Black Sea Region‘s Air Forces
Source: Hackett, J., ed. The Military Balance 2009 (London: IISS, 2009).
Table V: Military Expenditure
Notes: (1) SIPRI, “Military Expenditure Database,” http://milexdata.sipri.org/ (2) Figures do not include military pensions (3) Figures do not include spending on paramilitary forces (4) Estimates
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Military expenditure
million US$ (2007)1
195 2 680 806 720 8,780 5 17.3 2,3 1,974 33,821 4 11,155 3,278
Military expenditure
% of GDP (2007)1
3 % - 2.6 % 9.2 % 3.3 % 0.5 % 1.6 % 3.5 % 4 2.1% 2.9 %
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Table I: General Data
Notes: (1) CIA, “The World Factbook,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook (accessed April 7, 2010) (2) Eurostat, “Total Population,” http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.
do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin (3) State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, “Total Population,” http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/
operativ/operativ2009/ds/kn/kn_e/kn0809_e.html
 ANNEX III: General and Economic Data on the Black Sea Region States
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Area1 (in km2) 29,743 86,600 110,879 69,700 131,957 33,851 238,391 17,098,242 783,562 603,550
Population 2,967,0041 8,238,6721 7,606,5512 4,615,8071 11,260,4022 4,320,7481 21,498,6162 140,041,2471 71,517,1002 46,016,1863
Majority 
population1
97.9 % 90.6 % 83.9 % 83.8 % 93.0 % 78.2 % 89.5 % 79.8 % 75.0 % 77.8 %
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
GDP billion 
US$3
2008 11.917 46.378 49.904 12.864 357.548 6.047 200.074 1,676.586 729.983 179.604
20094 8.683 42.505 44.777 10.981 338.250 5.328 160.674 1,254.651 593.533 115.706
GDP /capita 
US$3
2008 3,684.555 5,349.391 6,560.723 2,923.545 32,105.106 1,692.547 9,310.386 11,806.947 10,479.452 3,909.873
20094 2,658.053 4,863.808 5,916.220 2,495.627 30,304.748 1,495.984 7,502.905 8,873.614 8,427.105 2,537.803
GDP (PPP)
billion US$ 3
2008 18.733 74.856 93.728 21.424 341.688 10.660 270.772 2,264.608 915.212 337.268
20094 16.057 81.730 89.002 20.887 344.404 9.852 251.741 2,126.390 869.068 294.564
GDP (PPP) /
capita US$ 3
2008 5,792.248 8,634.185 12,321.990 4,869.064 30,681.024 2,983.661 12,600.295 15,947.941 13,138.559 7,342.126
20094 4,915.734 9,352.212 11,759.518 4,747.123 30,856.107 2,766.370 11,755.413 15,039.048 12,339.193 6,460.737
Avg. Inflation 5 6.8% 10.8% 6.0% 2.1% 2.9% 7.2% 7.1% 5.6% 1.1% 2.1%
Unemployment rate 7.1%1 6.0%1 9.1%2 13.6%1 8.9%2 2.6%1 7.6%2 8.9%1 14.5%1 4.8%1
FDI (2008) million US$ 6 1,132 11 9,205 1,564 5,093 713 13,305 70,320 18,198 10,693
Table II: General Economic Data
Notes: (1) CIA, “The World Factbook,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook (accessed April 7, 2010) (2) EuroStat, “Total Population,” http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab
=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1 (3) IMF, “World Economic Outlook Database 2009,”  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/
weodata/index.aspx (4) Estimates (5) BSTDB, Annual Report 2008 (Thessaloniki: BSTDB, 2009), 14. (6) UNCTAD, “FDI Statistics,” http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3198&lang=1
The Black Sea in Figures
53
Armenia1 Azerbaijan1 Bulgaria2 Georgia1 Greece2 Moldova1 Romania2 Russia1 Turkey2 Ukraine1
2000 6.0 % 6.2 % 5.4 % 1.9 % 4.5 % 2.1 % 2.4 % 10.0 % 6.8 % 5.9 %
2001 9.6 % 6.5 % 4.1 % 4.7 % 4.2 % 6.1 % 5.7 % 5.1 % –5.7 % 9.2 %
2002 13.2 % 8.1 % 4.5 % 5.5 % 3.4 % 7.8 % 5.1 % 4.7 % 6.2 % 5.2 %
2003 14.0 % 10.5 % 5.0 % 11.1 % 5.9 % 6.6 % 5.2 % 7.3 % 5.3 % 9.6 %
2004 10.5 % 10.4 % 6.6 % 5.9 % 4.6 % 7.4 % 8.5 % 7.2 % 9.4 % 12.1 %
2005 13.9 % 24.3 % 6.2 % 9.6 % 2.2 % 7.5 % 4.2 % 6.4 % 8.4 % 2.7 %
2006 13.2 % 31.0 % 6.3 % 9.4 % 4.5 % 4.0 % 7.9 % 7.7 % 6.9 % 7.1 %
2007 3 13.7 % 25.0 % 6.2 % 12.4 % 4.0 % 3.0 % 6.0 % 8.1 % 4.5 % 7.6 %
2008 4 6.8 % 10.8 % 6.0 % 2.1 % 2.9 % 7.2 % 7.1 % 5.6 % 1.1 % 2.1 %
2009 5 –15.6 % 7.5 % –5.0 % –4.0 % –2.0 % –9.0 % –7.1 % –7.5 % –5.8 % –14.0 %
Table III: Growth Rates of the Black Sea Region States
Notes: (1) IMF, “World Economic Outlook Database 2009,” http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/index.aspx (2) Eurostat, “Real GDP Growth Rate,” http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.
eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsieb020 (3) BSTDB, Annual Report 2007 (Thessaloniki: BSTDB, 2008), 14. (4) BSTDB, Annual Report 2008 (Thessaloniki: BSTDB, 
2009), 14. (5) Estimates (except for Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania)
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Serbia Turkey Ukraine
1999 275.0 247.3 1,025.2 4,006.4 329.5 8,544.7 474.3 8,503.0 75,551.0 1,548.0 29,031.0 13,189.0
2000 255.7 309.9 1,858.3 4,824.6 459.0 10,201.5 476.8 10,366.0 105,033.0 1,645.0 30,825.0 15,722.0
2001 304.5 353.1 2,078.9 5,112.9 496.1 10,615.0 564.6 11,385.0 101,884.0 1,821.0 34,729.0 17,091.0
2002 330.2 513.8 2,304.9 5,354.1 603.3 9,865.4 659.7 13,876.0 107,301.0 2,212.0 40,719.0 18,669.0
2003 447.2 696.1 2,624.6 7,081.4 830.6 12,577.8 805.1 17,618.0 135,929.3 3,319.0 52,394.0 23,739.0
2004 603.3 738.3 3,743.0 9,931.2 1,092.1 15,739.0 994.1 23,485.0 183,207.0 4,082.0 68,535.0 33,432.0
2005 656.3 1,004.9 7,649.0 11,754.1 1,472.4 17,631.2 1,104.6 27,729.7 243,798.0 4,970.2 78,365.0 35,024.0
2006 792.9 1,025.5 13,014.6 15,101.4 1,666.5 20,300.4 1,058.7 32,336.0 303,550.0 6,441.9 93,611.0 38,949.0
2007 1,078.7 1,196.7 21,269.3 18,575.3 2,088.3 23,991.4 1,368.4 40,555.0 354,401.0 8,755.6 115,356.0 49,840.0
2008 1,355.7 1,112.0 30,586.3 22,585.5 2,428.0 29,162.7 1,640.8 49,626.0 471,603.0 10,956.5 140,999.0 67,717.0
Table IV: Exports of BSEC (in million US$)
Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
Table V: Total Exports of BSEC (in million US$)
Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
142,724.4 181,976.8 186,435.2 202,408.4 258,062.1 345,582.0 431,159.4 527,847.9 638,475.7 829,772.5
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Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Serbia Turkey Ukraine
1999 938.0 721.4 1,433.4 5,087.4 863.4 26,495.6 611.5 9,595.0 39,537.0 2,792.0 38,.802.0 12,945.0
2000 1,070.0 773.4 1,539.0 6,000.2 970.5 30,440.4 770.3 12,050.0 44,862.0 3,227.0 52,882.0 14.943.0
2001 1,331.6 773.3 1,465.1 6,693.4 1,045.6 29,702.0 879.7 14,354.0 53,763.7 4,129.0 38,092.0 16,893.0
2002 1,485.4 882.6 1,823.3 7,012.6 1,092.3 31,320.6 1,037.5 16,487.0 60,965.8 5,440.0 47,109.0 17,959.0
2003 1,783.5 1,130.2 2,723.1 9,657.3 1,468.6 38,183.6 1,428.1 22,155.0 76,070.0 7,340.0 65,883.0 23,221.0
2004 2,194.9 1,196.3 3,581.7 13,619.1 2,007.7 47,360.0 1,748.2 30,150.0 97,382.0 10,551.0 91,271.0 29,691.0
2005 2,477.6 1,592.8 4,349.9 17,204.4 2,686.3 51,899.5 2,296.1 37,348.1 125,434.0 10,260.0 111,353.0 36,159.0
2006 2,915.6 1,921.3 5,269.3 22,129.5 3,685.8 64,585.3 2,644.4 47,171.9 164,281.0 12,712.6 134,552.0 44,143.0
2007 3,978.3 2,796.9 6,045.0 28,566.7 4,984.0 81,041.2 3,676.4 65,121.0 223,486.0 17,886.0 162,025.0 60,412.0
2008 4,907.5 3,775.6 7,574.7 35,450.3 6,261.2 94,209.0 4,869.9 76,721.0 291,861.0 22,213.0 193,843.0 84,651.0
Table VI: Imports of BSEC (in million US$)
Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
139,821.6 169,527.8 169,122.4 192,615.1 251,043.3 330,752.8 403,060.6 506,011.8 660,018.6 826,337.1
Table VII: Total Imports of BSEC (in million US$)
Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Serbia Turkey Ukraine
1999 44.3 49.4 267.5 1,205.1 131.9 1,607.2 280.5 1,181.6 8,601.6 244.5 2,272.4 3,721.8
2000 40.2 69.5 344.1 1,637.7 193.7 2,107.0 292.3 1,765.1 11,621.8 298.6 2,507.3 5,335.1
2001 52.5 87.6 318.0 1,498.0 181.9 2,116.5 352.7 1,420.2 12,048.7 209.6 2,966.2 5,539.0
2002 51.1 93.7 360.7 1,696.0 180.2 2,043.0 370.9 1,504.8 13,229.9 267.1 3,637.2 5,653.4
2003 73.1 128.3 473.9 2,275.1 250.3 2,643.6 477.0 2,104.5 17,281.0 368.2 5,085.3 7,161.0
2004 87.9 125.5 750.1 3,113.9 343.2 3,208.5 545.3 3,461.0 25,106.9 568.4 6,823.8 10,492.0
2005 91.2 184.9 1,121.5 3,564.7 498.8 3,527.5 608.5 4,754.8 33,632.9 704.8 8,686.4 12,275.3
2006 100.8 204.2 1,325.5 4,936.2 499.0 4,393.5 529.2 6,015.9 43,412.1 962.3 11,679.3 14,265.6
2007 142.6 391.8 2,173.9 6,675.2 634.7 4,930.3 702.3 7,402.6 50,735.0 1,313.7 16,914.7 20,460.1
2008 157.9 375.9 2,527.0 8,134.5 884.7 5,518.5 886.1 10,093.9 72,393.5 1,663.1 21,135.5 26,123.1
Table VIII: Intra-BSEC Exports (in million US$)
Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
19,607.8 26,212.4 26,790.9 29,088.1 38,321.2 54,626.5 69,651.4 88,323.6 112,477.0 149,893.6
Table IX: Total Intra-BSEC Exports (in million US$)
Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Serbia Turkey Ukraine
1999 361.1 250.4 429.0 1,818.4 336.1 1,686.7 329.7 1,407.8 3,636.8 611.1 4,308.7 3,721.8
2000 427.4 272.2 443.6 2,578.0 348.1 2,467.7 391.9 2,173.4 4,987.0 944.9 6,748.0 5,335.1
2001 544.5 268.6 370.1 2,583.7 367.5 3,148.1 436.7 2,432.1 5,383.3 1,169.4 5,554.3 5,782.7
2002 596.5 379.2 547.8 2,469.0 389.3 3,978.4 516.2 2,670.9 4,912.2 1,273.4 6,589.2 6,724.6
2003 694.0 373.9 728.2 3,523.8 499.4 4,837.9 682.3 4,114.2 6,527.6 1,794.0 9,298.8 9,258.1
2004 784.8 416.9 1,000.5 4,688.9 853.2 5,736.8 925.1 5,557.9 8,798.9 2,496.0 15,370.2 12,542.1
2005 923.9 585.7 1,319.8 6,530.7 1,295.3 7,092.1 1,145.4 7,011.2 11,474.2 2,813.1 20,482.2 14,059.6
2006 1,127.2 778.2 1,998.9 8,459.4 1,953.0 8,362.2 1,451.7 8,771.3 14,171.2 3,857.9 27,023.8 15,540.5
2007 1,343.0 1,348.4 2,211.1 10,956.0 2,656.0 9,288.6 1,879.1 11,605.2 20,463.8 4,671.9 34,811.8 19,277.2
2008 1,531.5 1,743.7 2,850.9 13,806.9 2,984.5 12,619.4 2,413.7 13,199.3 26,333.3 6,255.3 45,632.6 23,497.3
Table X: Intra-BSEC Imports (in million US$)
Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
18,897.6 27,117.3 28,041.0 31,046.7 42,332.3 59,171.2 74,733.3 93,495.2 120,511.9 152,868.3
Table XI: Total Intra-BSEC Imports (in million US$)
Source: : Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
38,505.4 53,329.7 54,831.9 60,134.8 80,653.5 113,797.7 144,384.7 181,818.8 232,988.9 302,761.9
Table XII: Total Intra-BSEC Trade (in million US$)
Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
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Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Serbia Turkey Ukraine
1999 16.1% 20.0% 26.1% 30.1% 40.0% 18.8% 59.1% 13.9% 11.4% 15.8% 7.8% 28.2%
2000 15.7% 22.4% 18.5% 33.9% 42.2% 20.7% 61.3% 17.0% 11.1% 18.2% 8.1% 33.9%
2001 17.3% 24.8% 15.3% 29.3% 36.7% 19.9% 62.5% 12.5% 11.8% 11.5% 8.5% 32.4%
2002 15.5% 18.2% 15.6% 31.7% 29.9% 20.7% 56.2% 10.8% 12.3% 12.1% 8.9% 30.3%
2003 16.3% 18.4% 18.1% 32.1% 30.1% 21.0% 59.3% 11.9% 12.7% 11.1% 9.7% 30.2%
2004 14.6% 17.0% 20.0% 31.4% 31.4% 20.4% 54.9% 14.7% 13.7% 13.9% 10.0% 31.4%
2005 13.9% 18.4% 14.7% 30.3% 33.9% 20.0% 55.1% 17.1% 13.8% 14.2% 11.1% 35.0%
2006 12.7% 19.9% 10.2% 32.7% 29.9% 21.6% 50.0% 18.6% 14.3% 14.9% 12.5% 36.6%
2007 13.2% 32.7% 10.2% 35.9% 30.4% 20.6% 51.3% 18.3% 14.3% 15.0% 14.7% 41.1%
2008 11.6% 33.8% 8.3% 36.0% 36.4% 18.9% 54.0% 20.3% 15.4% 15.2% 15.0% 38.6%
Table XIII: Intra-BSEC Exports / Exports of BSEC Ratio
Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
13.7% 14.4% 14.4% 14.4% 14.8% 15.8% 16.2% 16.7% 17.6% 18.1%
Table XIV: Total Intra-BSEC Exports / Total Exports of BSEC Ratio
Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Serbia Turkey Ukraine
1999 38.5% 34.7% 29.9% 35.7% 38.9% 6.4% 53.9% 14.7% 9.2% 21.9% 11.1% 28.8%
2000 39.9% 35.2% 28.8% 43.0% 35.9% 8.1% 50.9% 18.0% 11.1% 29.3% 12.8% 35.7%
2001 40.9% 34.7% 25.3% 38.6% 35.1% 10.6% 49.6% 16.9% 10.0% 28.3% 14.6% 34.2%
2002 40.2% 43.0% 30.0% 35.2% 35.6% 12.7% 49.8% 16.2% 8.1% 23.4% 14.0% 37.4%
2003 38.9% 33.1% 26.7% 36.5% 34.0% 12.7% 47.8% 18.6% 8.6% 24.4% 14.1% 39.9%
2004 35.8% 34.8% 27.9% 34.4% 42.5% 12.1% 52.9% 18.4% 9.0% 23.7% 16.8% 42.2%
2005 37.3% 36.8% 30.3% 38.0% 48.2% 13.7% 49.9% 18.8% 9.1% 27.4% 18.4% 38.9%
2006 38.7% 40.5% 37.9% 38.2% 53.0% 12.9% 54.9% 18.6% 8.6% 30.3% 20.1% 35.2%
2007 33.8% 48.2% 36.6% 38.4% 53.3% 11.5% 51.1% 17.8% 9.2% 26.1% 21.5% 31.9%
2008 31.2% 46.2% 37.6% 38.9% 47.7% 13.4% 49.6% 17.2% 9.0% 28.2% 23.5% 27.8%
Table XV: Intra-BSEC Imports / Imports of BSEC Ratio
Source: : Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
13.5% 16.0% 16.6% 16.1% 16.9% 17.9% 18.5% 18.5% 18.3% 18.5%
Table XVI: Total Intra-BSEC Imports / Total Imports of BSEC Ratio
Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Serbia Turkey Ukraine
1999 33.4% 31.0% 28.3% 33.2% 39.2% 9.4% 56.2% 14.3% 10.6% 19.7% 9.7% 28.5%
2000 35.3% 31.5% 23.2% 38.9% 37.9% 11.3% 54.9% 17.6% 11.1% 25.5% 11.1% 34.8%
2001 36.5% 31.6% 19.4% 34.6% 35.6% 13.1% 54.7% 15.0% 11.2% 23.2% 11.7% 33.3%
2002 35.7% 33.9% 22.0% 33.7% 33.6% 14.6% 52.3% 13.8% 10.8% 20.1% 11.6% 33.8%
2003 34.4% 27.5% 22.5% 34.6% 32.6% 14.7% 51.9% 15.6% 11.2% 20.3% 12.2% 35.0%
2004 31.2% 28.0% 23.9% 33.1% 38.6% 14.2% 53.6% 16.8% 12.1% 20.9% 13.9% 36.5%
2005 32.4% 29.7% 20.3% 34.9% 43.1% 15.3% 51.6% 18.1% 12.2% 23.1% 15.4% 37.0%
2006 33.1% 33.3% 18.2% 36.0% 45.8% 15.0% 53.5% 18.6% 12.3% 25.2% 17.0% 35.9%
2007 29.4% 43.6% 16.1% 37.4% 46.5% 13.5% 51.2% 18.0% 12.3% 22.5% 18.6% 36.0%
2008 27.0% 43.4% 14.1% 37.8% 44.5% 14.7% 50.7% 18.4% 12.9% 23.9% 19.9% 32.6%
Table XVII: Intra-BSEC Trade / Trade of BSEC Ratio
Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
13.6 % 15.2 % 15.4 % 15.2 % 15.8 % 16.8 % 17.3 % 17.6 % 17.9 % 18.3 %
Table XVIII: Total Intra-BSEC Trade / Total Trade of BSEC Ratio
Source: Compiled by Panagiotis Gavras, Head of Policy & Strategy, Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB), Thessaloniki, 2008.
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Table I: Human Development Index 2007 – World Ranking
ANNEX IV: Human Development Index
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Rank 84 86 61 89 25 117 63 71 79 85
Rating 0.798 0.787 0.840 0.778 0.942 0.720 0.837 0.817 0.806 0.796
Source: UNDP, “Human Development Report 2009.” http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/81.html
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
1990 0.731 - - - 0.872 0.735 0.786 0.821 0.705 -
1995 0.693 - - - 0.874 0.682 0.780 0.777 0.730 -
2000 0.738 - 0.803 0.739 0.895 0.683 0.788 - 0.758 0.754
2005 0.777 0.755 0.829 0.765 0.935 0.712 0.824 0.804 0.796 0.783
2006 0.787 0.773 0.835 0.768 0.938 0.718 0.832 0.811 0.802 0.789
Table II: Human Development Index 1990 -2006 – World Ranking
Source: UNDP, “Human Development Report 2009.” http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/81.html
The Human Development Reports of the UNDP have introduced a new way of measuring development by combining indicators of life 
expectancy, educational attainment and income into a composite human development index (HDI). The HDI sets a minimum and a 
maximum for each dimension, called goalposts and then shows where each country stands in relation to these goalposts, expressed 
as a value between 0 and 1.
The educational component of the HDI is comprised of adult literacy rates and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, 
secondary and tertiary schooling. Since the minimum adult literacy rate is 0% and the maximum is 100%, the literacy component of 
knowledge for a country where the literacy rate is 75% would be 0.75, the statistic for combined gross enrolment is calculated in a 
analogous manner. The life expectancy component of the HDI is calculated using a minimum value for life expectancy of 25 years 
and maximum value of 85 years, so the longevity component for a country where life expectancy is 55 years would be 0.5. For the 
wealth component, the goalpost for minimum income is $100 (PPP) and the maximum is $40,000 (PPP). The HDI uses the logarithm 
of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing GDP. The scores for the three HDI components are then 
averaged in an overall index (http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/hdi/).
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Table I: Oil in 2009
ANNEX V: Natural Resources
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Reserves 
(thousand mln barrels – 2009)
0 7.00 0.015 0.035 0.010 0 0.60 60.00 0.30 0.395
Production 
(thousand barrels daily – 2008)
0 875.15 3.35 0.97 4.89 0 115.24 9,789.78 46.11 101.27
Consumption 
(thousand barrels daily – 2008)
47 121 120 17 433.98 15.80 255 2,916 675.54 370
Imports (thou-
sand barrels 
daily – 2008)
Crude oil1 0 0 144 0.300 386.67 0 48 174 437.28 230
Refined 
products
N / A N / A N / A N / A 134.24 N /  A N / A N / A 297.27 N / A
Exports (thou-
sand barrels 
daily – 2008)
Crude oil1 0 730 0 0 21.40 0 5,120 0 0 0
Refined 
products
N / A N / A N / A N / A 131.58 N / A N / A N / A 133.05 N / A
    
Source: EIA, “International Energy Statistics,” http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm 
Notes: (1) incl. lease condensate
Table II: Gas in 2009
Source: EIA, “International Energy Statistics,” http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Reserves 
(trillion cubic meters – 2009)
0 0.84 0.005 0.008 0.001 0 0.063 47.57 0.008 1.10
Production 
(billion cubic meters – 2008)
0 16.19 0.31 < 0.02 < 0.02 0 11.41 662.21 1.01 19.79
Consumption 
(billion cubic meters – 2008)
1.92 10.64 3.39 1.72 4.21 2.52 16.93 475.69 37.18 80.78
Imports 
(billion cubic meters)
1.92 0 3.08 1.72 4.19 2.52 5.49 56.88 36.72 64.19
Exports 
(billion cubic meters)
0 5.55 0 0 0 0 0 243.41 0.42 3.19
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ANNEX VI: Freedom of the Press
Table I: Freedom of the Press 2009 – World Ranking
Source: Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press 2009,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop/2009/FreedomofthePress2009_tables.pdf 
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Rank 151 168 76 128 63 148 92 174 101 115
Rating 68 78 36 60 29 67 44 80 50 55
Status Not Free Not Free Partly Free Partly Free Free Not Free Partly Free Not Free Partly Free Partly Free
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating Rank Rating
1995 57 69 39 70 26 47 50 55 73 42
1996 56 69 46 68 29 62 49 58 74 39
1997 56 74 44 55 27 57 47 53 65 49
1998 56 74 36 56 30 58 39 53 69 49
1999 56 73 39 57 30 56 44 59 69 50
2000 57 70 30 47 30 58 44 60 58 60
2001 59 76 26 53 30 59 44 60 58 60
2002 60 77 29 53 30 59 35 60 58 60
2003 65 73 30 54 28 59 38 66 55 67
2004 135 64 156 71 78 35 114 54 64 28 127 63 103 47 147 67 107 52 150 68
2005 134 64 158 72 77 35 116 56 61 28 136 65 104 47 145 68 105 48 123 59
2006 137 64 161 73 77 34 118 57 59 28 141 65 96 44 158 72 103 48 113 53
2007 142 64 164 75 76 34 120 57 54 25 144 65 90 42 164 75 105 49 112 53
2008 144 66 168 77 76 33 128 60 56 27 144 66 94 44 170 78 106 51 110 53
Table II: Freedom of the Press – World Ranking (1995 to 2008)
Source: Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press Historical Data,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=274  
Rating 0 – 30 31 – 60 61 – 100
Status Free Partly Free Not Free
The Freedom of the Press index, elaborated by Freedom House, is an annual survey of media independence in 195 countries and 
territories. The index assesses the degree of print, broadcast, and internet freedom in every country in the world, analyzing the 
events of each calendar year. It provides numerical rankings and rates each country’s media as “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” 
Country narratives examine the legal environment for the media, political pressures that influence reporting, and economic factors 
that affect access to information (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=16).
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Table I: Corruption Perceptions Index 2009 – World Ranking
ANNEX VII: Corruption
Source: Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2009”. http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table
Notes: The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world.
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Rank 120 143 71 66 71 89 71 146 61 146
Score 2.7 2.3 3.8 4.1 3.8 3.3 3.8 2.2 4.4 2.2
Surveys Used 7 7 8 7 6 6 8 8 7 8
Confidence Range 2.6 – 2.8 2.0 – 2.6 3.2 – 4.5 3.4 – 4.7 3.2 – 4.3 2.7 – 4.0 3.2 – 4.3 1.9 – 2.4 3.9 – 4.9 2.0 – 2.6
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
1995 (41 countries) – – – – 30 – – – 29 –
1996 (54) – – – – 28 – – 47 33 –
1997 (52) – – – – 25 – 37 49 38 –
1998 (85) – – 66 – 36 – 61 76 54 69
1999 (99) 80 96 63 84 36 75 63 82 54 75
2000 (90) 76 87 52 – 35 74 68 82 50 87
2001 (91) – 84 47 – 42 63 69 79 54 83
2002 (102) – 95 45 85 44 93 77 71 64 85
2003 (133) 78 124 54 124 50 100 83 86 77 106
2004 (145) 82 140 54 133 49 114 87 90 77 122
2005 (158) – 137 55 130 47 88 85 126 65 107
2006 (163) 93 130 57 99 54 79 84 121 60            99
2007 (179) 99 150 64 79 56 111 69 143 64 118
2008 (180) 109 158 72 67 57 109 70 147 58 134
Source: Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/previous_cpi
Table II: Corruption Perception Indexes 1995 to 2008 – Ranks
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 
180 countries and territories around the world. It is a “survey of surveys,” based on 13 different expert and business surveys. The CPI 
tables show a country’s ranking and score, the number of surveys used to determine the score and the confidence range of the scoring. 
The rank shows how one country compares to others included in the index. The CPI score indicates the perceived level of public-
sector corruption in a country/territory. The CPI is based on 13 independent surveys. However, not all surveys include all countries. 
The surveys used column indicates how many surveys were relied upon to determine the score for that country. The confidence range 
indicates the reliability of the CPI scores and tells us that, allowing for a margin of error, we can be 90% confident that the true score 
for this country lies within this range (http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table).
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Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Rank 113 135 52 104 22 62 50 107 87 53
Overall Score 4.09 3.19 7.02 4.62 8.13 6.50 7.06 4.48 5.69 6.94
Electoral Process 
and Pluralism
4.33 3.08 9.17 7.00 9.58 9.17 9.58 5.25 7.92 9.58
Functioning of 
Government
3.21 0.79 5.36 0.79 7.50 4.29 6.07 2.86 6.07 5.36
Political 
Participation
3.89 3.33 6.11 4.44 6.67 6.11 6.11 5.56 4.44 5.56
Political Culture 3.13 3.75 5.63 4.38 7.50 5.00 5.00 3.75 5.00 6.25
Civil Liberties 5.88 5.00 8.82 6.47 9.41 7.94 8.53 5.00 5.00 7.94
Table I: Democracy Index 2008 – World Ranking
ANNEX VIII: Index of Democracy
Source: “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008,” http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Rank 110 129 49 104 22 62 50 102 88 52
Overall Score 4.15 3.31 7.10 4.90 8.13 6.50 7.06 5.02 5.70 6.94
Electoral Process 
and Pluralism
4.33 3.08 9.58 7.92 9.58 9.17 9.58 7.00 7.92 9.58
Functioning of 
Government
3.21 0.79 5.71 1.79 7.50 4.29 6.07 3.21 6.79 5.71
Political 
Participation
3.89 3.33 6.67 3.33 6.67 6.11 6.11 5.56 4.44 5.56
Political Culture 3.13 3.75 5.00 5.00 7.50 5.00 5.00 3.75 3.75 5.63
Civil Liberties 6.18 5.59 8.53 6.47 9.41 7.94 8.53 5.59 5.59 8.24
Table II: Democracy Index 2006 – World Ranking
Source: “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy,”  http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/Democracy_Index_2007_v3.pdf
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Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Greece Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Rank – 3 – 6  3 – – – – – 5 +1 – 1
Overall Score – 0.06 – 0.12 – 0.8 – 0.28 – – – – 0.54 – 0.01 –
Electoral Process 
and Pluralism
–  – – 0.41 – 0.92 – – – – 1.75 – –
Functioning of 
Government
– – – 0.35 – 1.00 – – – – 0.35 – 0.72 – 0.35
Political 
Participation
– – – 0.56 +1.11 – – – – – –
Political Culture – – +0.63 – 0.62 – – – – +1.25 +0.62
Civil Liberties – 0.30 – 0.59 +0.29 – – – – – 0.59 – 0.59 – 0.30
Table III: Democracy Index – Comparison between 2008 and 2006
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the 
functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. The five categories are inter-related and form a coherent 
conceptual whole (http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf).
Overall Score 8 – 10 6 – 7.9 4 – 5.9 0 – 3.9
Status Full Democracy Flawed Democracy Hybrid Regime Authoritarian Regime
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Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Rank 62 86 14 52 61 16 65 20 37
Overall Score Status 5,75 4,85 8,36 6,03 5,79 8,23 5,70 7,54 6,55I. 
I. Democracy
Stateness 8,8 7,0 9,8 6,3 8,0 9,3 8,0 8,0 8,8
Political Participation 4,0 3,3 9,3 7,3 6,5 9,3 5,3 7,8 7,8
Rule of Law 4,5 4,0 8,3 5,5 5,8 8,3 4,3 7,3 6,3
Stability of Democratic Insti-
tutions
2,0 2,0 9,0 6,5 7,0 8,5 5,0 8,0 6,5
Political and Social Integration 5,8 3,3 7,5 4,8 6,0 7,3 3,8 7,3 5,8
II. Market Economy
Socioeconomic Level 4,0 5,0 7,0 4,0 3,0 7,0 6,0 5,0 5,0
Market Organization 6,5 5,5 8,8 7,5 5,5 8,8 6,0 8,5 6,8
Currency and Price Stability 8,0 6,5 9,0 7,5 7,0 9,0 8,5 8,5 6,5
Private Property 8,0 6,0 9,0 7,0 5,5 9,0 4,0 8,5 6,0
Welfare Regime 5,5 5,5 7,0 4,0 4,0 7,0 6,0 7,0 6,0
Economic Performance 8,0 7,0 8,0 6,0 5,0 8,0 8,0 8,0 7,0
Sustainability 5,5 5,0 7,0 6,0 4,5 7,0 4,5 6,5 5,5
Table I: Status of Democracy and Market Economy Index, BTI 2001
ANNEX IX: Democracy and Management of Transformation
Source: “The Transformation Index of the Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI) 2010”, http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/en/ 
Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria Georgia Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine
Rank 85 95 14 42 79 25 107 23 66
Management Index Score 4,36 4,05 6,67 5,68 4,49 6,27 3,41 6,34 4,92
Level of Difficulty 4,2 5,1 2,8 6,0 5,7 3,0 4,0 3,6 3,9
Steering Capability 4,7 4,0 7,3 6,0 4,3 7,0 4,0 8,0 5,7
Resource Efficiency 4,7 4,0 7,0 6,7 4,0 6,3 4,3 6,7 4,0
Consensus-Building 4,0 4,2 8,4 5,6 5,2 8,0 4,4 6,6 6,4
International Cooperation 6,7 6,0 9,0 6,7 6,3 8,3 3,0 8,3 6,7
Table II: Managmenet of Transformation, BTI 2010
Source: “The Transformation Index of the Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI) 2010”, http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/en/ 
The Transformation Index BTI of the Bertelsmann Stiftung is a ranking of 128 developing and transition countries. It sheds light 
upon the political and economic status of each country as well as upon the political management performance by the relevant actors. 
Detailed country reports provide information on the underlying factors of assessment for each country examined. The rating scale 
for each area ranges from 10 (best) to 1 (worst) (http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/en/). 
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Abbreviations
BLACKSEAFOR Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group
BSANNA Black Sea Association of National News Agencies
BSC The Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution 
  (a.k.a. the Black Sea Commission)
BSEC The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BSNN Black Sea NGO Network
BST-GMFUS Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation – a project of 
  the German Marshall Fund of the United States
BSTIP Black Sea Trade and Investment Promotion Programme
BSTDB Black Sea Trade and Development Bank
CBMs Confidence-Building Measures
CDC Community of Democratic Choice
CFE Treaty Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organisation
DABLAS The Danube Black Sea Task Force
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
EU  European Union
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GMF German Marshall Fund of the United States
GUAM-ODED Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
ICBSS International Centre for Black Sea Studies
ICPDR International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River
IFI  International Financial Institution
IMF International Monetary Fund
INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe
MAP Membership Action Plan (NATO)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PABSEC Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC
PfP  Partnership for Peace
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
SCAD South Caucasus Anti-Drugs Programme
SEECP South East European Cooperation Process
SME Small and Medium Enterprises
Abbreviations
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TEN Trans-European Networks
TEPAV Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia
UBCCE Union of Black Sea and Caspian Confederation of Enterprises
UN  United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
US / USA United States / United States of America
WTO World Trade Organization
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Initiators
International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), Athens
The International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) was founded in 1998 as a non-profit 
organisation under Greek law. It has since fulfilled a dual function: On the one hand, it is an 
independent research and training institution focusing on the wider Black Sea region. On the 
other, it is a related body of the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and 
in this capacity serves as its think-tank. As such it has direct access to policy makers in the BSEC 
member states and a vast network of contacts in research institutes and with other stakeholders. 
Since its founding, the ICBSS has a accumulated rich experience in policy-oriented research and 
advocacy work. It plays a central role in strengthening Black Sea – EU cooperation and regularly 
produces publications, policy recommendations and events with the overarching aim of fostering 
cooperation among and with the countries of the Black Sea region.
www.icbss.org
Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Ankara
The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) is an independent, non-governmental, 
non-partisan think-tank, established in October 2004. TEPAV aims to increase the knowledge 
content of policy discussions in Turkey. The goal of TEPAV research is to remove the gap between 
academic research and policy implementation. TEPAV is composed of three institutes. They are the 
International Policy Research Institute – IPRI, the foundation is composed of the Economic Policy 
Research Institute – EPRI and the Economic Stability Institute – ESI. TEPAV makes its findings and 
analysis widely available through its publications and events.
www.tepav.org.tr
Initiators
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The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, a project of the German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, Bucharest
In order to promote regional cooperation and good governance in the wider Black Sea region, GMF 
started the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation. A public-private partnership, the Black Sea 
Trust (BST) works in collaboration with a range of donors to provide grants to local organisations 
working to foster and strengthen regional cooperation, civil society, and democratic foundations.
The broad goals of the Black Sea Trust are four-fold:
• To rebuild trust in public institutions
• To affirm the value of citizen participation in the democratic process
• To strengthen a critical set of institutions that lie at the nexus of state and society
• To foster regional, cross-border ties in the public, private, and non-profit sectors
www.gmfus.org/blacksea 
 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh
Founded in 1977, the Bertelsmann Stiftung is a private, independent and non-partisan foundation 
that aims to identify social problems and challenges at an early stage and develop solutions to 
address them. The Bertelsmann Stiftung is both a think tank and an agent for social change and 
is working to promote steady development that leads to a sustainable society. It focuses on areas 
in which it has accumulated a wealth of experience over many years. Its work is geared towards 
improving education, a just and efficient economic system, a preventative healthcare system, a 
vibrant civil society and greater international understanding.
In the area of international politics, the Bertelsmann Stiftung has gained expertise in fields such 
as democracy and integration, modern government, European integration, as well as security 
policy. It has developed the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI), an international 
ranking of 125 developing and transition countries which permits a focused comparison of the 
status of a country’s democratic and market-economy structures, as well as the efficacy of its 
reform strategies.
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
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The Report
The Black Sea region is coming into its own – but it is a contested and sometimes dangerous neighbourhood. 
What is needed are regional solutions for regional problems, but how do we get them? The Commission on the 
Black Sea was formed to suggest ways for this increasingly important but volatile region to move in the direction 
of cooperation and collaboration and away from conflict and rivalry. It was formed to provide policy-oriented 
research on the challenges and opportunities of the Black Sea region and to suggest ways to secure its peace 
and prosperity. 
“The Commission believes in the potential of the Black Sea, its people and governments. We believe 
that our recommendations can serve as a means to begin to release it.” 
An initiative of:
The Black Sea Trust 
for Regional Cooperation
